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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AS A MIRROR OF THE 
FUTURE: CIVIC VALUES CONFRONTING MARKET 
FORCE DYNAMICS IN A TIME OF 
COUNTER-REVOL UTION 
Zygmunt J.B. Plater* 
1. INTRODUCTION: LEGISLATIVE ASSAULTS, A FUNDAMENTAL 
PARADIGM, AND AN EGREGIOUS PUN 
This essay explores the legislative assaults currently faced by en-
vironmental law, as the powerful market forces that gained at least 
temporary congressional ascendancy in November 1994 attempt to 
roll back legal doctrines and structures evolved in thirty years of 
bipartisan development.! The "counter-revolutionary" tumult of the 
104th Congress2 reflects a basic confrontation-between the powerful 
* ©ZJBP. Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. Buck DeWolf, Bill Goldfarb, Jeff 
Kopf, Lou Leonard, Bill Shutkin, Nate Stearns, Bruce Wickersham, and Annmarie Wixon 
generously gave useful suggestions on parts of this piece, although they bear no blame for the 
ample deficiencies that remain. 
1 This essay represents the continued development of an idea first presented in a symposium 
on Environmental Law after 25 Years, Zygmunt J.B. Plater, From the Beginning, a Fundamen-
tal Shift in Paradigms: A Theory and Short History of Environmental Law, 27 Loy. L.A. L. 
REV. 981 (1994) [hereinafter Plater, From the Beginning], and a symposium at the University 
of Richmond commemorating the 20-year anniversary of the Allied ChemicallKepone disaster, 
Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Facing a Time of Counter-Revolution-The Kepone Incident and a 
Review of First Principles, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 657 (1995) [hereinafter Plater, First Principles]. 
2 It is probably inappropriate to label the current political climate a "backlash," which implies 
a broad societal rejection of what has been accomplished. Despite justified criticisms of particu-
lar features of some programs, there appears to be continuing popular support for most envi-
ronmental values and programs. Rather it seems more like a counter-revolution, an opportun-
istic initiative by burdened interests to challenge and overturn first principles of environmental 
accountability. 
The 104th Congress is the focus of the current antienvironmental initiatives and this essay. 
There have, of course, been other past and continuing political assaults on environmental 
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human nature dynamics of market forces and society's need for en-
forceable civic values that transcend short-term profit expediencies. 
Environmental law, reflecting a paradigm shift in how we perceive 
the world, has emerged over the past three decades as one of the 
primary realms in which society attempts to insert short and long-
term public civic values into practical economic affairs. This role in-
evitably makes environmental law a political battlefield. A survey of 
some of the current battles, framed in that social context, allows some 
useful long-term observations. 
A. The Assaults 
After the avalanche of the 1994 elections, the GOP's Contract with 
America, an erstwhile election gimmick, became the legislative agenda 
of a potent new congressional majority-to the apparent astonishment 
of its own authors.3 Although the Contract did not mention the word 
"environment,"4 it has become quite clear that environmental protec-
tion laws were among its major veiled targets. As the new majority 
moved into power, long-simmering market forces launched a congres-
sional counter-revolution, seemingly dedicated to dismantling the le-
gal evolution of the past three decades and unlearning the scientific 
and policy lessons so painfully gained over those years. 
Facing only feeble opposition and an overwhelmed press that did 
not know how to deal with the deluge, the 104th Congress's majorities 
produced a remarkable "first hundred days," and a flood of bills, 
law-through court actions, state legislation, the Sagebrush Rebellion, and the Wise Use 
movement, in agenda-driven judicial appointment processes as in the Nixon and Meese-Sununu 
eras, in judicial politics cutting back on plaintiffs' tort and citizen enforcement litigation, in the 
standing and administrative intervention battles of the 1980s, and the like. 
3 He Did It (Newt Gingrich Completes Contract with America) (American Survey), ECONO-
MIST, Apr. 8, 1995, at A25. See generally Robert L. Glicksman & Stephen B. Chapman, Regu-
latory Reform and (Breach of) The Contract With America: Improving Environmental Policy 
or Destroying Environmental Protection?, 6 RAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'y, (forthcoming Winter 
1996), at 1 (analyzing the vision of environmental regulation reflected in the reform proposals 
of Contractarians). 
4 The GOP's post-election book expanding upon the Contract with America mentions the 
environment, but barely. See REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, THE CONTRACT WITH 
AMERICA 126, 141 (1994) (declaring that "the Clean Air Act expressly forbids agencies from 
weighing economic effects" and also claiming that mandatory cost-benefit procedures would not 
"reverse all of the environmental progress made over the past two decades .... [They] would 
provide greater accountability and guard against the creation of more politically motivated 
regulations. Government exists to serve everyone, not the interests of the few."). 
The sections of the Contract most relevant to environmental law are § 8, the "Job Creation 
And Wage Enhancement Act" and § 9, the "Common Sense Legal Reform Act." 
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riders, and low-profile technical amendments attempting to roll back 
environmental law: 
• suspending all substantive regulations retroactive to the election 
and freezing all ongoing major rulemaking for a year; 
• drastically cutting protective agencies' budgets and specifically 
forbidding enforcement against various industrial lobbyists' clients; 
• overriding all laws applicable to forestry conservation by mandat-
ing an increase in the subsidized clearcutting of public forests; 
• repealing the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments; 
• cutting back on dozens of provisions in the Clean Water Act; 
• reducing the Endangered Species Act to a symbolic minimum; 
• decommissioning national parks or opening them to commercial 
uses; 
• drilling the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge; 
• requiring rigorous and time-consuming cost-benefit procedures 
when agencies protect resources, but not when they issue permits to 
exploit them; 
• forcing government to compensate industry for virtually all regu-
latory burdens on asset market value; 
• shifting regulatory responsibilities toward state governments, 
which are traditionally more vulnerable to market forces, and also 
overriding state common law provisions burdensome to industry; 
• and dozens more.5 
A number of these bills passed one or both chambers of Congress; a 
few of the bills became law.6 Industrial lobbyists played an unusually 
overt role in drafting, propelling, and managing the bills through the 
104th Congress.7 
5 See infra section II. 
S The major provisions that passed into law were drastic appropriations cuts for EPA, the 
Department of the Interior, and other environmental protection agencies. See, e.g., Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1995 (Rescissions Act), 
Pub. L. No. 104-19, 109 Stat. 194 (1995) (containing the "Timber Salvage" rider); Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions for the Department of Defense to Preserve and 
Enhance Military Readiness Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-6, Tit. II, ch. IV, 109 Stat. 73, 86 (1995) 
(prohibiting the use of federal money for listing a species as threatened or endangered or for 
listing critical habitat); Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, § 426(b), 
109 Stat. 48 (to be codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.) (1995) (requiring that if a member 
makes a point of order that there is an unfunded mandate in a pending bill or amendment, 10 
minutes of debate on each side is allowed, followed by a House vote on whether to consider the 
measure). 
7 The nature of the process was revealed by a wistful memo from an aide to Sen. Slade Gorton 
(R-Wa.) when lobbyists delivered an anti-endangered species bill to him for introduction. The 
memo noted "[t]he [timber and mining] coalitions delivered your ESA ... bill to me on Friday 
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As the 1996 elections approached, however, the lobbyists and an-
tienvironmental majorities at least temporarily began to downplay 
the agenda, as they belatedly recognized popular antipathy to envi-
ronmental cuts.8 The Contract on environmental law currently ap-
pears to be in remission. If reaffirmed in the 1996 elections, however, 
it is poised to metastasize. 
It is the thesis of this essay that the 1995 assault on environmental 
law in the 104th Congress is instructive, not only for revealing the 
majority's agenda as important national elections approach, but also 
for illuminating the fundamental human nature behind the dynamic 
market forces that dominate daily life, the societal role of environ-
mental law, and the long-term requirements of democracy and ra-
tional public environmental policy. 
B. The Paradigm Shift and the Perceptions of Civic Value 
Environmentalism over the past thirty years has shaped and reflected 
a fundamental paradigm shift in how we perceive human society in 
its geophysical context.9 In its development since 1960, environmental 
law has embodied a new way of seeing cause-and-effect that can be 
traced back to the work of Ronald Coase and Rachel Carson-recog-
nition of an ineluctable human tendency toward externalization of 
social costs (Coase's teaching), and the cumulative, interconnected, 
and disruptive consequences that can follow from such externalization 
.... I know that you are anxious to get the bill introduced, however, it is important that we 
have a better than adequate understanding of the bill prior to introduction." Christopher 
Hansen, Dispute on Gorton Memo: Critics Say it Shows Business Lobby Wrote Species Bill, 
SEA'ITLE PosT-INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 7, 1995, at AI. Later that day the lobbyists sent the 
Senator a section-by-section description of the bill so that he would know what he was advocat-
ing.Id. 
B A GOP poller reported that "[o]ur party is out of sync with mainstream American opinion" 
on environmental regulation. See John H. Cushman, Jr., GOP Backing Offfrom Tough Stand 
Over Environment, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1996, at AI. Advisories were sent out to members that 
they should attend tree-plantings and similar events to distance themselves from charges of 
antienvironmentalism. As The New Republic has noted, the three major issues that have 
chastened the latter months of the 104th Congress were popular disgust with the House's 
budget-hostage maneuvers, environmental protection cuts, and the crude dominance of special 
interest lobbyists-all of which implicate environmental politics. Hanna Rosin, Whiplash, NEw 
REPUBLIC, Feb. 19, 1996, at 17. 
9 Lately, there has been a tendency to label far too many things as "paradigm shifts." See, e.g., 
Brian Dumaine, Distilled Wisdom: Buddy, Can You Paradigm? FORTUNE, May 15, 1995, at 
205. I too have been guilty of this proliferative tendency by purporting to find multiple basal 
shifts in a single decade. See Plater, From the Beginning, supra note 1, at 998-1007. I recant. 
Here I set out only one such concept, but the Coase-Carson analytical construct is significant 
and fundamental enough to be called a paradigm shift. 
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(Carson's teaching).lO Environmental law evolved as a response to the 
dark side of those dynamic market forces that have built the world's 
largest economy and have made modern life so materially enriched 
and diverse.ll Human nature as reflected in the marketplace, however, 
inherently tends to ignore and pass on social costs to the environment 
and to others. 
For example, if I am producing a market good in a manufacturing 
process that also creates harmful effects or wastes, the costs of neu-
tralizing the harms will be an unwelcome burden that I will try to 
avoid by dumping the effects or wastes outside my sphere of respon-
sibility-into the creek, into the air, into consumers, into the land, 
away. These externalized social costs, however, create serious long-
term, cumulative, interconnected consequences that demand serious 
attention and are ignored at our peril. Recognizing the functional 
importance of this perception, environmental law has used old law and 
new statutes to create a legal structure to monitor, restrict, and 
account for the externalized social costs created by market forces. 
Since 1960, beginning in the United States and continuing onto the 
international plane, our society has experienced an extraordinary 
development of scientific knowledge, law, and policy regarding the 
physical and ecological world in which we live. Our quest for this 
learning was driven by a recognition of systemic environmental prob-
lems and threats that were only incidentally perceived prior to 1960. 
At its heart, environmental law has come to incorporate a set of 
principles representing and accounting for civic values that extend far 
beyond the realm of science and current events. Perhaps only in 
environmental law has the modern legal system directly incorporated 
issues of long-term societal survival into its operative norms and 
doctrinal provisions.12 
10 RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (25th Anniversary ed. 1987) (1962); Ronald Coase, The 
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (showing how rational actors in the marketplace 
seek to internalize benefits and externalize costs). Carson's Silent Spring was arguably the most 
important single trigger of the environmental great awakening-the scientific treatise that 
brought an ecological consciousness into the American mainstream. 
11 Few environmentalists advocate a Luddite retreat to the pastoral, or government domina-
tion of the economy. Individual and corporate initiatives contributed immeasurably to the 
mobilization and growth of technological sophistication in our society, and few believe that 
economies centrally directed by government bureaucracies offer equal or better prospects. The 
point is that society does not have to choose between the market and the government. Both 
must playa healthy part to have a healthy society. 
12 The "sustainability principle" is a prime example of the influence of environmental thinking 
on our law, as are current legal norms for cleaning up contaminated lands beyond the limited 
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By thus embodying civic values, environmental law transcends ecol-
ogy and raises issues of social governance.13 Scratch an environmental 
law argument and you are likely to find an underlying question of 
democracy-how individuals, corporations, and communities are to 
balance their drives and needs, each day and over future years and 
generations. 
c. The Pun: The Four Horsemen of the Ecopalypse 
And then there is a particularly bad pun that emphasizes the long-
term utilitarian importance of environmental law. Professor Arnold 
Reitze has observed that there are three major human-caused prob-
lems threatening our long-term ability to sustain global quality of 
human life in the natural setting we inherited from our ancestors: 
Population, Wasteful Consumption of Resources, and Pollution.14 All 
three reflect the serious implications from the human tendency to 
externalize costs by ignoring the consequences of individual human 
actions upon the commons. 
But observing where we are today, there is a need to identify four 
systemic problems, Four Horsemen of the Ecopalypse. The Fourth 
Horseman of the Ecopalypse is a critically important governance 
problem-The Gap between What We Know and What We DO.15 De-
dictates of current market values, for managing stratospheric ozone and the carbon dioxide 
functions of global forests on behalf of planetary health, and for implementing utilitarian pro-
tections of the natural legacy of endangered species and ecosystems against unnecessary de-
struction, and the like. See WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR 
COMMON FUTURE 43 (1987) [hereinafter OUR COMMON FUTURE] (commonly referred to as 
"Brundtland Report"). Sustainable Development was the theme featured in the 1992 United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio. 
13 Not to mention mores. The vibrant field of environmental ethics-almost totally ignored by 
our legislators in the political process-has recently produced a rich body of moral considera-
tions for environmental protection extending beyond strict utilitarianism. Coupled with my 
assertion that only environmental law incorporates doctrinal considerations of the requirements 
of a civic "hereafter," it is appropriate and heartening that this Article finds itself appearing in 
this journal with two companion pieces oriented toward moral environmental responsibilities. 
See Chuck D. Barlow, Why the Christian Right Must Protect the Environment: Theocentricity 
in the Political Workplace, and David E. DeCosse, Beyond Law and Economics: Integrating 
a Theological Ethics Perspective Into the Regulatory Takings Debate, immediately following 
this Article. 
14 Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Environmental Policy-It Is Time for a New Beginning, 14 COLUM. 
J. ENVTL. L. 111, 115-17 (1989). Reitze noted that the first of these is the most important and 
daunting; the last is the least critical of the three. Guess where we spend most of our effort. 
15 Although this is an egregious pun, without the fourth element there is no representation 
of causative force, of the human Haws-"hamartia"-that drive the first three. By adding this 
fourth human-caused dysfunction to the inventory, the consequences of an underlying human 
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spite a truly amazing expansion of ecological knowledge-about pol-
lution, population, resource losses, and the interconnectedness of human 
and natural systems, and the ability to communicate that knowledge 
globally at the speed of light-it is distressing to observe the differ-
ence between knowledge and practice. Our capacity to implement 
what we know about these serious threats consistently falls short, and 
may even be falling further behind.16 
Why, internationally and domestically, does the Fourth Horseman 
find us falling short in implementing societal controls over environ-
mental problems? I would argue that the process of achieving what 
we know should be done is held back by the same powerful market 
dynamics that drive human enterprises and cause externalizations 
in the first place. The same market forces that make civic regulation 
necessary, constantly and assiduously attempt to resist and undercut 
that regulation.17 
The syllogism goes like this: 
Reflecting human nature, the market forces that build the 
economy instinctively attempt to externalize costs ... 
which necessitates some form of externally-imposed regulation 
incorporating public values ... 
which in turn these market forces continuously, comprehensively, 
and powerfully resist . . . . 
And in the 104th Congress, those market forces, clothed in the garb 
of populism, have tried to roll back and overturn the civic regulations 
that constrain private entrepreneurial interests. 
It is no surprise that the Marketplace resists the imposition of 
public values upon private enterprises. For years in Corporate Law, 
we have taught that the duty of corporations-which playa dominant 
dilemma are denoted as a global problem, and the phrase coincidentally becomes somewhat more 
memorable. 
16 From global warming and expansion of populations beyond carrying capacity, to overgraz-
ing, the crash of fisheries, and pollution in urban neighborhoods, we usually know what causes 
the problems and how to stop them, but effectively addressing this need seems to be humanly 
impossible. See infra section IV. 
17 The phenomenon of interlocking negative consequences is not just an American concern. 
The experience of other countries and, at the level of international governance, the fractional-
izing tendencies of 175 separate sovereignties, echo the dysfunctional externalization paradigm. 
With only a few exceptions, such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer, which is probably the most significant example of an international environmental con-
vention that works, treaties with enforceable constraints on externalizations do not get ratified, 
and treaties that do get ratified tend to have ample loopholes or no teeth. MONTREAL PROTOCOL 
ON SUBSTANCES THAT DEPLETE THE OZONE LAYER, Sept. 16, 1987,26 I.L.M. 1550 (1987). 
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role in every free society, and in none more so than ours-is to 
maximize the interest of their shareholders, not to advance any altru-
istic broader public good. "Get Government out of the way of the 
Marketplace" would theoretically be an acceptable societal principle 
if the Market could and would accomplish the necessary public duties 
for which government is designed. But it cannot or will not. Estab-
lishments do not self-correct when faced with the discovery that their 
self interest conflicts with external civic values. The doing of public 
good (beyond some positive spillover effects of corporate self interest) 
is systemically consigned to voluntary organizations like churches and 
scout troops-a thousand points of light confronting a million points 
of profit?-and, more tangibly, to government. 
But market forces are arguably the most dominant and powerful 
structures in modern society, a position that sets up a serious problem. 
When governments attempt to impose "artificial" non-market public 
values upon an industry (or upon private individuals), there is an 
understandable and inherent instinct to attempt to avoid or resist such 
imposition and the attendant costs. Multiply the tendency of each eco-
nomic entity to resist cost internalization by tens of thousands of corpo-
rations, and the result is a vast concurrent resistance that permeates 
and erodes the effort to instill civic values in the governance process. 
How do marketplace actors react to regulations and guidelines 
applying public values that undercut private gain? They react in quite 
understandable human terms: 
• seeking to comply, especially (though not exclusively) when regu-
lations are mandatory and credible enforcement is likely; 
• seeking to avoid compliance, on the facts by denying the existence 
or validity of the problem and trying to avoid proof of violations, or 
on the law by contesting the authority of agencies, courts, or private 
citizen plaintiffs, and aggressively litigating every step of the way;lS 
• trying to undercut regulatory effectiveness by advocating cuts in 
appropriations, particularly appropriations for enforcement; 
• trying to modify or repeal the restrictive requirements of statutes 
and regulations, arguing that "the pendulum has swung too far."19 
18 Confrontation is often coupled with seduction: agency staffers are lured into the camps of 
the industries they regulate through the "capture" phenomenon well known to Political Science. 
See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND 
SOCIETY 557-61 (1992) [hereinafter PLATER ET AL., NLS). 
19 The author started hearing this pendulum-too-far phrase as early as 1971 in conversations 
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These strategies can run concurrently. In the first decade of envi-
ronmentallaw, when enforcement structures were new and uncertain, 
resistance to enforcement was probably a prevalent mode, along with 
simultaneous limited gestures toward compliance.2o Subsequently, as 
environmental law enforcement has become surer and better known, 
many corporate enterprises have institutionalized compliance efforts 
through vigorous inspection, self audits, and organizational redesign. 
"We have seen the light," say some executives. "Now trust us, and go 
after someone else."21 The fact that industries generally move toward 
compliance, however, does not mean that they also abandon their 
attempts at avoidance strategies. 
The Contract Congress reflects a shift of the regulated market's 
focus toward the latter two strategies-cutting appropriations and 
overturning the laws on the books. The runaway first session of the 
104th Congress has demonstrated a moment of market force domi-
nance of governmental processes, its perils, and its antidotes. If mar-
ket forces effectively dominate the regulatory mechanisms of govern-
ment-which were created in the first place to correct the Market's 
failure to integrate necessary public civic values-then where and by 
whom will these public civic values be brought into the process of 
social governance? 
The antidote, as current events seem to indicate, is a process that 
ensures the consideration of public merits-within environmental law, 
and within legislative initiatives that attempt to override environ-
mental law. This process requires informed and engaged profession-
als, an incisive press, and an active citizenry. Environmentalism, in 
other words, often ends up being another word for democracy. 
with paper industry officials. That was before any significant federal regulation of toxics had 
passed, before the Clean Water Act's (CWA) National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) had gone into effect, before most modern water quality standards had been defined. 
20 The Allied Chemical Corporation's reaction in the early days of federal water pollution 
enforcement was classic. Faced with the new federal program and extensive dumping from its 
Hopewell Virginia plant, the company made plans to shift the effluents to the public sewer 
system, meanwhile providing the federal government with limited (and inaccurate) compliance 
information. See PLATER ET AL., NLS, supra note 18, at 42-49, 336-46. 
21 See Anne L. Kelly, The Limits of Corporate Self Regulation: Keeping the Environmental 
Heat on Those Who Haven't Seen the Light (forthcoming, in author's files). While recognizing 
and applauding widespread market internalization of environmental compliance, environmental 
advocates do not advise abandonment of vigorous enforcement programs. Just as effective drug 
interdiction or securities fraud programs cannot shut down once their targets acknowledge their 
enforcement credibility, agencies and citizens have to maintain credible monitoring and enforce-
ment activity. 
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II. THE 104TH CONGRESS AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
House Republicans are united in the belief that the people's House must 
be wrested from the grip of special interests and handed back to you, 
the American people. 
-Rep. Richard Armey (R-Tex.) 
(on the Capitol steps announcing the Contract with America)22 
Early in 1994 more than 300 industry groups gathered together to 
create "Project Relief," a lobbying movement to roll back governmen-
tal regulation across a wide swath of American society. They repre-
sented industrial lobbies ranging from chemical manufacturers and 
automobile lobbyists to insurance companies and national restaurant 
and farm equipment suppliers, and poured $19 million into the 1994 
congressional campaigns.23 The Project was brought together by Rep. 
Thomas DeLay (R-Tex.), now the majority whip in the 104th Con-
gress.24 Project Relief began to develop a comprehensive list of pot en-
tial initiatives and pressure points within the legislative process.25 
After the November 1994 elections the Marketplace's long-simmering 
resentment against the imposition of public regulation suddenly found 
itself with enthusiastic congressional majorities, and proceeded to 
generate a parade of bills to change America and American environ-
mental law. 
It is useful to catalogue some of the details of this legislative ava-
lanche, in part because the volume and complexity of the initiatives 
have impeded us from comprehending the cumulative impact of the 
legislation. The missed opportunities for scrutiny in turn reflect a 
basic problem in following congressional maneuvering-process opac-
22 Jack Torry, GOP Unveils 'Contract,' PI'ITSBURGH POST-GAZETI'E, Sept. 28, 1994, at A8. 
23 See Michael Weisskopf & David Maraniss, Forging an Alliance for Regulation, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 12, 1995, at AI; see also Vicki Monks, Capitol Games, NAT'L WILDLIFE, Apr./May, 1996, 
at 22, 22--23. 
24 A pest exterminator before entering Congress, DeLay had long been convinced that envi-
ronmental concerns were extreme. He had been particularly angered by EPA's toxic chemicals 
regulation. DDT is "not harmful," he asserted. "DDT is as safe as aspirin." Kathy Sawyer, Gore's 
Scientific Approach to GOP Cuts, WASH. POST, Feb. 28,1996, at A17; see also Jonathan Alter 
& Thomas Rosenstiel, D.C.'s Geek Chic, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 11, 1995, at 39. 
25 Project Reliefs payments included contributions of $87,126 to now-Speaker Gingrich, and 
more than $330,000 each to Sen. Kay Hutchinson (R-Tex.) and Sen. Larry Craig (R-Idaho), both 
leaders in Senate regulatory reform initiatives. See Monks, supra note 23, at 23; see also ESA-
Members Got $65 Million from PACs Opposing Endangered Species Protection, Nat. Envtl. 
Daily (BNA) (Mar. 25, 1996) (noting a report issued by the D.C.-based Environmental Working 
Group revealing sums donated by antienvironmental PACs to legislators). 
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ity. In order for public opinion and public accountability to bear upon 
congressional actions, what Congress does must be visible. The an-
tigovernmental initiatives of the 104th Congress's first session were 
so fast, furious, numerous, and often obscurely technical, that the 
press largely was caught flatfooted and proved unable to cope. Thus, 
the public too saw only a blur.26 
Here are a few vivid object lessons coming from the 104th Congress 
in its first year that provide a glimpse into the agenda and posture of 
the majority blocs that seized the initiative in January 1994. The 
examples chosen actually passed one or both chambers of Congress. 
They reveal a tendency to undercut public regulation of private en-
terprise generally, and environmental protection in particular. More-
over, their terms reflect a continuation of the Coasian tendency to 
externalize industrial costs, as well as direct authorship by the af-
fected interests. 
A. The Regulatory Moratorium Bill 
On February 24, 1995, the House of Representatives passed House 
Bill 450, the "Regulatory Transition Act of 1995," initially drafted by 
Gordon Gooch, a Project Relief lobbyist for the petrochemical indus-
try, which included as its major provision a freeze and rollback of 
federal regulations.27 Section 3(a) of the bill provided that "a federal 
agency may not take any regulatory rulemaking action until the end 
of the moratorium period, unless an exception is provided . . . "28 
Exceptions were provided in section 5 only if: 
the administrator ... finds in writing that a waiver for the action 
is (a) necessary because of an imminent threat to health or safety 
or other emergency, or (b) necessary for the enforcement of crimi-
26 See Joe Davis, The Scoop that Never Was, AMICUS J., Summer 1995, at 18 (noting how even 
the most extreme legislative erosions of environmental protection, like the "Timber Salvage" 
rider, were scarcely examined by the media, and hence resulted in raids on public values and 
the public domain). 
27 H.R. 450, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Its lead sponsor was GOP whip Rep. Tom DeLay. 
H.R. 450 passed the House on Feb. 24, 1995 with a vote of 276 to 146. 141 CONGo REC. D239--01 
(daily ed. Feb. 24, 1995). Senate Bill 219, S. 219, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), a similar but more 
limited measure, passed the Senate on March 29, 1995. See 141 CONGo REC. S4758 (daily ed. Mar. 
29, 1995). Sponsored by Don Nickles (R-Okla.), it also sought to create a formal process giving 
Congress 45 days to review and reject a final regulation before it takes effect. Project Relief 
lobbyists were instrumental in shaping a number of the moratorium's provisions. Martin Walker, 
Environment: License to Pollute, GUARDIAN, Sept. 6, 1995, at 4. 
28 H.R. 450, 104th Cong., 1st. Sess. § 3(a) (1995). The bill covered a period beginning November 
20, 1994 and ending whenever the President signed a mandatory regulatory costlbenefit analysis 
and risk assessment statute, or December 31, 1995. Id. § 6(2). 
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nal laws .... [or by § 6(3)(b) where the agency is] repealing, 
narrowing, or streamlining a rule, regulation, or administrative 
process or otherwise reducing regulatory burdens, ... [or which 
OMB certifies] is limited to a routine administrative function.29 
The scope of the moratorium is breathtaking, going far beyond 
environmental regulations and in one stroke eliminating most federal 
regulations passed, pending, or proposed over an entire year. In fact, 
rules would be suspended without knowing what they were. Congress 
prepared no inventory to list which, or even how many, regulations 
would be affected.30 Estimates put the number of regulations that 
would have been suspended by the Senate bill at 900, and by the 
House bill at 4300!31 
What kind of regulations would the bill have nullified? The structure 
of federal laws has been so interwoven into modern society that virtually 
every area of public-private concern would have been touched.32 That 
this far-reaching, yet unconsidered, moratorium bill captured such a 
rousing majority of the 104th Congress, particularly the bloc of sev-
enty-three freshmen, shows not only a gut resentment against gov-
ernmental restraints, but also a mugwumpian readiness to launch 
29 Id. § 5. One other exception was added on the floor to validate rules allowing hunting and 
fishing seasons to proceed. Id. § 6(A)(4). This reflected a Senate amendment, No. 415, offered 
by Senator Pryor (D-Ark.) to ensure that "migratory bird hunting season will not be canceled 
or interrupted, and that commercial, recreational or subsistence activities related to hunting, 
fishing, or camping will not be cancelled or interrupted." 141 CONGo REC. S4705-D2 (daily ed. 
Mar. 28, 1995). 
30 The House bill did, however, ask the President to prepare a report that would tell them 
after the fact what they had done. The bill provided that "[n]ot later than 30 days after the date 
of the enactment of this act, the president shall conduct an inventory and publish in the Federal 
Register a list of all regulatory rulemaking actions covered by subsection (a)." H.R. 450, 104th 
Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(b) (1995). 
31 Se'IWte Gets Moratorium Bill; Democrats Likely to Battle, HAZMAT TRANSPORT NEWS, 
Mar. 13, 1995, at 1. 
32 As an example, taking just one randomly chosen day's rulemaking notices in the Federal 
Register, November 22, 1995, there were 26 rulemakings that appeared to fall under the 
suspensions of the moratorium bill, 12 of them final and 14 proposed rulemakings. 59 Fed. Reg. 
60,061 (1995). They included a few environmental regulations, like acid rain rules, air quality 
control rules, ocean fishing quotas for Alaska, and a favorite target of the grazing lobby, the 
reintroduction of endangered gray wolves into Yellowstone Park. Id. at 60,061-284. But they 
also included airplane airworthiness certification rules, insurance for disabled veterans, licensing 
of local radio and TV stations, milk and citrus subsidies, immigration rules, air traffic control 
airspace definitions, voter registration, prison inmate pretrial procedures, food stamp rules, 
Federal Reserve rules, and provisions for paying state governments certain expenses in imple-
menting federal programs. Id. 
The Alaska fishing quota rules are an example of government rules that are needed by market 
forces in order to protect the market's own resource base. See Plater, First Principles, supra 
note 1, at 674-77. 
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sweeping, simplistic measures to clear the decks without considering 
consequences. 
Something in most of us resents regulation. The resentment builds 
on our continuing frontier fantasy that to some extent we are still 
rugged individualists living on the edge of wilderness. But in truly 
conservative terms, in the sense that conservatism is grounded in a 
precautionary principle, it is surprising that the House majority could 
propose to wipe out a vast amount of sub-delegated adjectival law-
making-authorized by statutes over the last fifty years and proc-
essed through elaborate procedures established under the Adminis-
trative Procedures Act and the V nited States Constitution-with so 
little intellection. In addition to the fact that legislators did not know 
what rules the moratorium would nullify, there were virtually no 
legislative hearings (unless one counts talk radio) for the moratorium 
bill or for many of the other bills in the Contract agenda. The Article 
I legislative process, as it had been known over the last 100 plus years, 
was substantially bypassed. The moratorium seems to have been an 
exercise of brute political force. 
B. The Bill Amending the Clean Water Act 
As an example of the Contract's initiatives on a substantive pollu-
tion control regulatory system, consider House Bill 961, a bill amend-
ing major aspects of the Clean Water Act (CWA).33 The CWA has been 
one of the three major pollution control statutory frameworks devel-
oped by bipartisan coalitions in Congress since 1970.34 
The fundamental perception that led to the passage of the CW A 
was that, left to their own, the states had been unable to implement 
adequate pollution protection. Without federal minimum standards, 
an intense interstate competition for jobs and revenues sets up a "race 
to the bottom," a "race of laxity," a "pollution competition," in which 
states have powerful incentives to lower environmental standards. 
States that enforce environmental protections tend to lose their in-
dustries to states that have less stringent enforcement systems. As a 
result, state governments generally have been more susceptible than 
33 H.R. 961, l04th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); see also 141 CONGo REC. D612-01 (daily ed. May 16, 
1995) (showing the House passing H.R. 961 by a vote of 240 to 185). 
34 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994) (initially referred to as the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act Amendments of 1972). The other nominees for most significant pollution acts are the Clean 
Air Act Amendments of 1970,42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994), and the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92k (1994). 
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the federal government to the lobbying blandishments of industry.35 
In addition to the threats from a race to the bottom, federal interven-
tion was necessary because pollution is an interstate problem.36 
But water pollution control costs industry large amounts of money. 
The federal enforcement scheme for the CW Ns National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) program was bitterly re-
sented for toughening standards beyond state water quality require-
ments. Echoing the classic industrial bromide, Rep. Zach Wamp (R-
Tenn.) proclaimed that with the House's proposed changes to the 
CWA, "[w]e're bringing the pendulum back to the middle."37 
1. Generally Applicable Changes Under H.R. 961 
H.R. 961 generally aimed to diminish the federal role that had been 
established as a threshold necessity from the inception of the CWA. 
H.R. 961's lead sponsor, Rep. Bud Shuster (R-Pa.), claimed that the 
bill would give states and local communities flexibility in controlling 
pollution in their waterways. Shuster argued that the bill would not 
reduce environmental protection because "the states still have the 
right to impose whatever standards they choose to impose . . . ."38 
That argument deftly ignored history and incorporated questionable 
and revealing premises-that states will have the ability and desire 
to enforce pollution standards despite interstate competition for in-
dustry, that environmental protection can be achieved with noncoor-
dinated efforts, and that provisions to lower standards and proce-
dures would not compromise water quality protection as a result. 
35 A shift back to state-level regulation has been one of the themes of recent antienvironmental 
market initiatives, not based on any consistent theory of state's rights, but based on the 
pragmatic basis that most state governments are vulnerable to market political pressures. The 
l04th Congress concurrently has attempted to override state common law remedies. See infra 
text accompanying note 92. 
36 More than 20 states receive more than 50% of their water pollution from other states, and 
an additional 15 states receive 25-50%. Data from a U.S Geological Survey report cited in 
Randolph E. Schmid, Polluted Water: Perils of Living Downstream, AP Wire Service, June 2, 
1995, available in Westlaw (ASSOCPPS), 1995 WL 4390992; Traveling Pollution Tracked by 
Study, Contamination Arrives Via Ohio, Missouri, Mississippi Rivers, CHARLESTON DAILY 
MAIL, June 3,1995, at P5B; Water Needs National Rules; Scientific Report Rebuts Thrust of 
House Bill, BUFFALO NEWS, June 11, 1995, at F8. 
37 H.J. Hebert, House Begins Debate on Bill Rewriting Clean Water Act, AP Wire Service, 
May 10, 1995, available in Westlaw (ASSOCPPS), 1995 WL 6727639. 
38 [d.; H.J. Hebert, House Panel Passes Bill Easing Water-Pollution Controls, AP Wire 
Service, Apr. 6, 1995, available in Westlaw (ASSOCPPS), 1995 WL 6722991. Section 101 of H.R. 
961 announces a new emphasis upon state efforts in regulating water pollution (although in fact 
the old CWA and Clean Air Act had the same kind of declaration, their terms emphatically 
asserted binding federal minimum standards). 
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Whatever the states define as sufficient water quality protection, 
apparently, would be enough. The House bill would have created a sea 
change in the national approach to water quality. The federal govern-
ment's primary role in pollution regulation would no longer be the 
minimum floor that secures national water quality. 
Here are some of H.R. 961's strategic changes for the CWA: 
• Multiplying administrative procedures: 
The bill requires judicially reviewable cost-benefit analysis and risk 
assessment procedures before the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) or the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) can promulgate 
any standard, effluent limitation, water quality criterion, or other 
CWA requirement (other than a permit or procedural requirement), 
or issue any guidance, that would result in annual cost increases to 
the regulated community of $25 million or more, unless EPA or the 
Corps certifies that net benefits to society exceed the monetary costS.39 
Risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis have been tactical favorites 
of the anti-regulation lobbyists, spawning several plenary cost-benefit 
requirement bills as well.40 The requirement sounds fundamentally 
rational, but sets up so many procedural hoops that public interest 
advocates call it "paralysis by analysis." 
• Eliminating statutory deadlines: 
Since 1972 the CWA has incorporated set deadlines for required 
administrative implementation stages, which, though often missed, 
nevertheless put pressure on EPA's judicially overseen regulatory 
process-a process that otherwise tends to bog down in protracted 
negotiations with regulated industries. H.R. 961 would replace statu-
tory deadlines with the subjective (and thus difficult to enforce) re-
quirement that standards be implemented "within a reasonable pe-
riod of time as determined by the administrator or the state, as 
appropriate, considering facility planning, design, construction, and 
other implementation factors,"41 inviting traditional market arguments 
for continuing delays in water quality regulation. 
• De-defining point sources: 
The trigger to the CWA's most intensive regulatory requirements 
is the point source; every point source requires a permit. N onpoint 
sources are scarcely regulated. In some cases, rather than redefining 
39 H.R. 961, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 302, 307, 324(b) (1995). Section 302 also provides that 
the state may apply its own balancing calculus: "The state may consider information reasonably 
available on the likely social, economic, energy use, and environmental cost associated with 
attaining such standards in relation to the benefits to be attained." [d. § 302. 
40 See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. 
41 H.R. 961, 104th Cong., 1st Bess. § 301 (1995). 
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standards downward, the bill responds to particular lobby pressures 
by declaring that such point source discharges are not point sources.42 
• Weakening standards: 
The bill repeals the current requirement for states to develop Total 
Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs) on water quality-limited stretches 
in all cases.43 Under the bill, states would only be required to establish 
TMDLs to the extent that they deem them "necessary to achieve 
reasonable progress toward the attainment or maintenance"44 of water 
quality standards, again inviting the competitive pressures upon states 
to undercut state water quality efforts . 
• Weakening the enforcement basis of standards: 
One provision blocks enforcement of violations of whole-effluent-
toxicity standards if the permittee, after the violation, conducts a 
voluntary Toxicity Reduction Evaluation.45 
• Weakening nonpoint source pollution regulation: 
The CWA, although not setting specific standards, requires non-
point source pollution to be subject to "best management practices."46 
The House bill strikes the word "best."47 The current CWA also re-
quires that state programs be designed "to achieve implementation 
of the best management practices .... "48 The bill, however, replaces 
that standard with a weaker, more subjective instruction "to manage 
... nonpoint sources to the degree necessary to provide for reasonable 
further progress toward the goal of attaining water quality standards 
within 15 years of approval of the state program."49 N onpoint source 
42 Section 322 of H.R. 961 states, for example, that animal feedlot wastes are not to be called 
point sources even when they are piped directly into a stream, thus overriding existing prece-
dent. See Concerned Area Residents For The Environment (CARE) v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 
114, 120 (2nd Cir. 1994), cert. denied, -U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 793 (1995). These discharges, then, 
would be virtually unregulated. Likewise stormwater runoff in urban areas would not be 
regulated, discarding a program that had been developed in negotiations over the past 10 years. 
H.R 961, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 322 (1995). 
43 See CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(I)(D). 
44 H.R. 961, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 308 (1995). 
45 [d. § 310. 
46 33 U.S.C. § 1329(b)(2)(A). 
47 H.R. 961, l04th Cong., 1st Sess. § 319(b)(2) (1995). 
48 33 U.S.C. § 1329(b)(2)(B) (emphasis added). 
49 Moreover, H.R. 961 provides for further suspensions of that deadline by one year for every 
year that Congress underfunds the program, a self-fulfilling invitation to delay. H.R. 961, 104th 
Cong., 1st Sess. § 319(b)(2). The bill also would repeal § 6217 of the Coastal Zone Management 
Act Amendments of 1990 which made a small move toward nonpoint source pollution control in 
coastal zone areas. [d. § 308. 
The bill also would establish a statutory hierarchy for nonpoint source control meaSures. [d. 
§ 319. Under that hierarchy, the EPA should seek compliance-first by voluntary action; second 
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pollution, which constitutes a huge portion of pollution load on some 
water bodies, has always been the weak sibling of the water quality 
provisions, and now would be forced to take a further step back. 
• Straight exemptions: 
The bill also contains some straight exemptions that reflect particu-
lar members' affiliations and local grievances-exempting sewage from 
secondary treatment requirements in San Diego, the island of Puerto 
Rico, and communities under 20,000;50 exempting various coal mining 
operations from water quality compliance;51 exempting certain agri-
cultural lands from wetlands protections;52 and declaring that water 
quality standards of CWA section 401 do not apply to dam projects 
when hydroelectric licensing raises questions about effects upon down-
stream water quality and fish mortality.53 
2. Specifically Targeting Wetlands Under H.R. 961 
H.R. 961 directed even sharper attacks against the CW Ns protec-
tion of wetlands, reflecting legislative animus against what Rep. James 
Hayes (D-La.) has characterized as a serious clash between "the 
rights of individuals and the power of the government," in which 
government had to be rolled back.54 
Wetlands have evolved in prominence over the past few decades as 
ecologists have discovered their important natural functions and mar-
ket forces have found that wetlands often lie in the way of develop-
ment. Modern science has documented the role of wetlands in reduc-
ing the frequency, peak levels, and volume of flood waters; in recharging 
groundwater supplies; in providing reproductive and shelter habitat 
for fish and wildlife; and in supporting many ecological cycles and 
aesthetic amenities.55 
by giving pollution prevention and other economic incentives to industry; and last, (if all else 
fails) by mandatory measures. [d. § 319(b)(2)(B). 
50 H.R. 961, l04th Cong., 1st Sess. § 309(t) (1995). 
51 See id. § 107. 
52 See id. § 803(g)(2). 
53 See id. § 507(b). The hydroelectric provision overrides the Supreme Court's decision in PUD 
No.1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of Ecology which held that the FERC 
licensing process cannot undercut state water quality standards. -U.S.-, 114 S.Ct. 1900, 1914 
(1994); see H.R. 961, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 507(b) (1995). 
54 Hebert, supra note 37. 
65 See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, OUR NATION'S WETLANDS: AN 
INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE REPORT 19-29 (1978) [hereinafter OUR NATION'S WETLANDS]; see 
also PLATER ET AL., NLS, supra note 18, at 444-48. In its pioneering Charles River Study 
(1972), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (New England Division) demonstrated that compre-
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Market forces, in turn, have felt increasing irritation with the ex-
pansion of federal and state wetlands protection since the late 1960s.56 
Up to that time, roughly half of the nation's wetlands had been lost 
in a seemingly inexorable march of land development. The remaining 
wetland areas generally had survived because of their marginality. 
But burgeoning population pressures, coupled with a frontier mental.) 
ity of constantly looking for virgin terrain,57 have made wetland'!> 
become increasingly attractive to developers. Previously marginal 
wetlands feed a land market appetite because of their relatively lower 
cost or because filling them allows aggregation of larger developable 
tracts.58 
Here is what H.R. 961 would do to wetlands if passed: 
• Narrow the definition of wetlands: 
The current legal definition of wetlands revolves around ecological 
considerations-specifically vegetation, soil, and hydrology. 59 The N a-
tional Academy of Sciences prepared a long-awaited report entitled 
Wetlands: Characteristics and Boundaries (Report), which was re-
leased in time for the House debate on H.R. 961.60 The Report ex-
hensive protection of existing wetlands in the Charles River watershed would produce more 
protection from floods than $4 billion worth of traditional concrete control works, dikes, dams, 
and levees. See generally U.S. CORPS OF ENGINEERS, CHARLES RIVER WATERSHED, l\trf\SA-
CHUSETTS (1972). 
66 Wetlands protection became tangible when the 1899 Rivers and Harbors Act resurfaced in 
the late 1960s as an enforceable water statute, and subsequently the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) was held to imply environmental responsibilities upon the Corps. See Zabel 
v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199,213 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971); PLATJ;;R ET AL., NLS, 
supra note 18, at 322-27. 
57 One of the chief differences between development in the U.S. and elsewhere is the sprawl 
and chaotic settlement patterns that reflect most private developers' tendency to want to start 
out with a clean slate. There seems to be a reluctance to consolidate investment and redevel-
opment on previously developed land. As developers continually look to the remaining undevel-
oped areas in a region to provide larger tracts and lower-cost siting, human development 
sprawls outward in an ad hoc and highly inefficient automobile-based settlement pattern. 
68 Wetlands became so controversial that the Reagan Administration attempted to recall and 
destroy all copies of Our Nation's Wetlands, supra note 55, a report prepared by federal 
agencies to show the economic, ecological, and aesthetic values of wetlands. In the Bush 
Administration, faced with the President's campaign promise of "no net loss of wetlands," Vice 
President Quayle led efforts to permit increased development of wetlands by changing the legal 
definition of what counted as a wetland. Michael Weisskopf, Wetlands Protection and the 
Struggle Over Environmental Policy, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 1991, at A17 (detailing debate over 
definition of "wetlands" and reporting that Quayle went from proposing to define wetlands as 
areas that were covered by water 80% of the time, to proposing "when it's wet, it's wet"). 
69 See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (1995); see also United States Corps of Engineers, CORPS OF ENGI-
NEERS WETLANDS DELINEATION MANUAL 13-14 (1987) (defining wetlands). 
60 Michael Terrazas, H.R. 961 Limits Federal Wetland Protection, AM. CITY & COUNTY, July 
1995, at 20. 
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pressed general satisfaction with the CWA section 404 program as 
presently administered. It asserted that isolated and headwater wet-
lands and riparian zones required even stricter regulation. The Re-
port, however, was ignored in the final bill. The bill would truncate 
the definition of wetlands to a strict twenty-one day saturation re-
:J.uirement and add a variety of functional tests unrelated to scientific 
i?tandards-all of which would result in a major reduction in the 
amount of wetlands protected from dredge and fill. 61 
• Narrow federal jurisdiction: 
H.R. 961 provides that no U.S. waters or wetlands shall be subject 
to CW Pis section 404 protections based solely on the fact that migra-
tory birds use or could use the waters or wetlands.62 There has been 
a running argument about federal commerce clause jurisdiction over 
wetlands that are not connected directly or indirectly to navigable 
waters.63 Many of the nation's remaining wetlands are "isolated wet-
lands" -swales, "potholes," and inland bogs that are not so connected-
and their importance for migratory waterfowl was the basis for a 
finding of section 404 jurisdiction in Hoffman Homes v. Administra-
tor U.S. E.PA.,64 which the provision would override. Past wetlands 
cases also could have their federal jurisdiction reopened to challenges 
under this provision . 
• IT ,pose a market-oriented balance upon wetlands protection: 
The bill contains a general exhortation to the EPA administrator. 
[I]n implementing his or her responsibilities under the regulatory 
program under this section, the secretary shall balance the objec-
tive of conserving functioning wetlands with the objective of en-
suring continued economic growth, providing essential infrastruc-
ture, maintaining strong state and local tax bases, and protecting 
against the diminishment of the use and value of privately owned 
property.65 
61 H.R. 961, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 803 (1995). Previously, the agencies had used a definition 
of wetlands based on ecological parameters, and rejected a 1989 proposal to use a 14-day 
saturation test. H.R. 961's new 21-day definition would be even less protective than this 
rejected proposal. 
62 [d. 
63 The United States Supreme Court has never ruled on the extent of "waters of the United 
States" where they are unconnected to navigable waters. See United States v. Riverside 
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131-35 (1985). A recent case, decided by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, asserted federal jurisdiction based on such a com-
merce linkage and a migratory bird treaty. See Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Administrator U.S. 
E.P.A., 999 F.2d 256, 261 (7th Cir. 1993). 
64 Hoffman Homes, 999 F.2d at 261-62. 
65 H.R. 961, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 803 (1995). 
752 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 23:733 
The effect of this charge is unclear, since the process in which such 
standards would apply is not specified. The drift of it, however, is 
clearly to undercut the ecological bases of current wetlands protection . 
• Require compensation for regulation of wetlands: 
H.R. 961, acting on a statutory, rather than a constitutional basis,66 
would force the government to "compensate an owner of property 
whose use of any portion of that property has been limited by an 
agency action under this section that diminishes the fair market value 
of that portion by twenty percent or more."67 It directs the federal 
government to compensate a property owner when a wetlands deter-
mination, permit denial, or permit condition causes any portion oftke 
property to decrease in value by greater than twenty percent. If the 
diminution in value is greater than fifty percent, the federal govern-
ment must, at the owner's option, buy the burdened portion of the 
prop erty. 68 
• Rank wetlands and cap category protections: 
H.R. 961 requires the Corps, upon receiving a permit application, 
to classify a wetland as either Type A, B, or C, in declining rank of 
importance.69 Type A wetlands, the most valuable, are subject to a 
"sequencing" of protective standards that weigh the "practicability" 
of protection, thus internalizing a balancing factor in favor of devel-
opment.70 Type B wetlands permitting is to be based on a determina-
tion of "the public interest" as measured by a benefit-cost analysis. 
Type C wetlands lose protection entirely. In states where the Corps 
decides that there exist "sufficient conserved wetlands to provide 
66 The constitutional challenges to wetlands regulations in the courts have been significant, 
but largely have failed to cripple wetlands protection. See PLATER ET AL., NLS, supra note 18, 
at 449-53. It often comes down to a "baseline game." If the court finds that landowners retain 
a reasonable remaining economic use for their land, on consideration of the entire parcel and 
not just the regulated portion, regulations are usually sustained. Justice Stevens's majority 
holding in Keystone Bituminous Coal v. DeBenedicts basing the takings calculus on the entire 
property owned, has generally been followed except in Federal Circuit holdings. 480 U.S. 470, 
480 (1987); see Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 27 F.3d 1545, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en 
banc). The divide-and-conquer definition process urged in Justice Rehnquist's Keystone Bitu-
minous Coal dissent, advocating what Prof. Radin has called "conceptual severance," appar-
ently proves too much. Margaret J. Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents 
in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1674 (1988). 
67 H.R. 961, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 803(d) (1995). 
68 Id. Compensation is not necessary where the administrative action is intended to prevent 
a public health or safety hazard or damage to specific neighboring property. 
69Id. § 803(e). 
70 Moreover, no more than 20% of a county could be designated as highest-value, 'lYpe A, 
wetlands, even in the Everglades. 
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adequate wetlands conservation," Type A and B wetlands restrictions 
can be applied "only where economically practicable" and mitigation 
requirements are prohibited. 
The CWA amendments bill is evidently the product of a heavy-
handed industrial lobbying process that overrode the civic-minded 
water quality protection ethic of Congresses since 1972. Instead of 
maintaining a federal baseline upon which market decisions have to 
be made, the bill would have reduced water resource regulation to a 
sidebar theme dominated by short-term economic practicability. The 
bill's shifting of authority to the states appears to have been driven 
by the same pressures that necessitated a federal act in the first place, 
the tendency of industrial producers to push for lower standards that 
created the invidious interstate race of laxity prior to the 1970s. 
C. Appropriations and Appropriations Riders 
1. Appropriations 
The appropriations process is historically one of the most powerful 
and least visible mechanisms of congressional lawmaking. Substantive 
bills from substantive committees are more visible. They address 
tangible subject matters, definable policy positions, and statutory 
terminology that invite debate. Appropriations bills, on the other 
hand, are focused on funding and can hide their dramatic effects 
within hundreds of lines of numerical quantities, but their impact can 
be drastic. 
Concurrently with substantive initiatives, the Contactarians launched 
an appropriations strategy that some environmentalists dubbed a 
"Stealth Attack" on environmentallaw.71 The appropriations assault 
included massive across-the-board cuts and particularized cuts, along 
with riders that, by their terms, effectively nullified specific regula-
tory programs. On the grand scale, appropriations reductions paral-
lelled some of the budget authority conflicts in which the federal 
government has repeatedly been brought to the brink of default. In 
order to obtain the chaotic parade of continuing budget resolutions 
from a recalcitrant House, the Clinton Administration has been forced 
71 Natural Resources Defence Council, Stealth Attack: Gutting Environmental Protection 
Through the Budget Process (July 1995). 
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to accept continuing twenty-five percent cutbacks in EPA and De-
partment of Interior budgets. 
The EPA appropriations bill is a vivid case in point. House Bill 2099 
would have cut the agency's total multiprogram budget by a full thirty 
percent, from 1995's $7.2 billion down to $4.9 billion.72 These cuts affect 
the budget of an agency that has been charged with implementing an 
ever-expanding list of dozens of major programs, from toxics and lead 
paint poisoning to ozone, asbestos, and wetlands. 
Even more illuminating were reductions in funding for enforce-
ment. H.R. 2099 specifically cut the budget for enforcement activities 
down to $1.8 billion, a drastic fifty percent cut from the preceding 
year.73 If agency representatives do not have the resources to go into 
the field to inspect ongoing industrial activities (and there are recur-
ring stories of federal officials unable to visit a plant or field because 
they lack transportation), then the laws for practical purposes are as 
good as suspended. 
2. Appropriations Riders 
And then there were the riders. The EPA funding bill as originally 
passed by the House contained more than a dozen riders that tran-
sparently revealed the influence of different industriallobbyists.74 
Here's what Title III of H.R. 2099 would do to EPA funding: 
• Prohibit spending any funds for implementation, enforcement, or 
research on pollution standards for organo-chlorine and other toxic 
residues in the Great Lakes-a potential enforcement program that 
concerned industries discharging into Great Lakes, and the chlorine 
industry in particular. 
72 H.R. 2099, l04th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (passed by the House July 2, 1995). 
73 [d. at Title III. 
74 [d. Similar strategies often have been used in other contexts. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchin-
son (R-Tex.) hitched to H.R. 889, the Defense Appropriations Act, a rider rescinding $1.5 million 
from the Department of Interior and prohibiting the listing of endangered and threatened 
species and critical habitat. See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions for 
the Department of Defense to Preserve and Enhance Military Readiness Act of 1995, Pub. L. 
No. 104-6, Tit. II, ch. IV, 109 Stat. 73, 86 (1995). 
In a similar maneuver focused on Interior, Rep. Jerry Lewis (R-Ca.) attached a rider to the 
Fiscal 1996 Interior Appropriations Bill, H.R. 1977, l04th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), designed to 
circumvent the California Desert Protection Act of 1994 by appropriating only $1.00 to the 
National Park Service to manage the new Mojave National Preserve. To fill the inevitable 
management gap, the bill gave the development-minded Bureau of Land Management (which 
formerly received $1.5 million annually to manage the same area) $599,999 to manage the 
Preserve. 
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• Prohibit spending funds for a stormwater permitting program, as 
well as the EPA oversight of sewer overflows that was resented by 
municipal government officials. 
• Prohibit EPA from any actions regulating wetlands under the 
CW Ns section 404, leaving that role completely to the more pliant 
Corps. . 
• Freeze the development and implementation of new or revised 
effluent limitation guidelines and standards, pretreatment standards, 
or new source performance standards under the CWA. This provision 
would have provided a strategic windfall to industries for which effluent 
standards were currently pending, including the pharmaceutical in-
dustry, metal products and machinery industry, and the pulp and 
paper industry. 
• Prohibit funding of any requirement that a state implement trip 
reduction measures (i.e., limits on traffic volumes) aimed at reducing 
vehicular emissions under section 304 of the Clean Air Act. 
• Prohibit use of funds "to develop, propose, promulgate, issue, 
enforce, or to set or enforce compliance deadlines or issuance sched-
ules for maximum achievable control technology standards" -a pro-
vision sought by air polluting industry to undercut a compromise on 
toxic emissions under the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. 
• Prevent risk management plan requirements under section 112(r) 
of the Clean Air Act from being extended to the domestic oil and gas 
industry and the natural gas industry. Under the statute, chemical 
accident prevention programs, which require such things as hazards 
estimates, worst case scenario planning, prevention plans, and emer-
gency preparedness planning, are all open for public review. Because 
EPA final rules are not yet in force, this rider would completely stop 
the program. 
• Prevent promulgation of further safe drinking water standards 
for radioactivity or arsenic contaminations-a loophole apparently 
sought by several state governments facing expensive water purifica-
tion costs. 
• Prevent tightening of regulation or closing down of toxic chemical 
incineration by the cement kiln industry, which has developed a major 
sideline in burning toxics. 
• Prevent EPA from forcing companies to disclose toxic chemical 
data under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know 
Act or section 8 of the Toxic Substances Control Act. 
• Override the Delaney Clause, section 409 of the Federal Food, 
Drug and Cosmetic Act, which prohibits any amounts of cancer-caus-
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ing pesticides or additives in processed food. For years critics have 
assaulted this provision as overly strict and deserving of a risk bal-
ance, while other voices supported the clause as a necessarily stark 
standard. The rider shortcuts the debate on behalf of the food and 
agriculture industries . 
• Prohibit use of voluntary environmental audit reports to assess 
an administrative, civil, or criminal negligence penalty where states 
recently have passed audit privileges, a provision that facilitates im-
munity against prosecution and was pushed in Congress by the Cor-
porate Environmental Enforcement Council75 and the Corporate Com-
pliance Management and Policy Group. 
The range and precision76 of these appropriations provisions are 
instructive, illuminating the interests dominating the legislative proc-
ess and the nature of a process in which appropriations riders typi-
cally are not noticed by the press, much less debated by the pUblic. 
In this case, however, national environmental groups were able to 
attract press attention to the array of industry riders, and ultimately 
firmed up President Clinton's veto of the bill, leaving H.R. 2099 one 
artifact of the counterrevolution that did not come to pass. 
D. Other Antienvironmental Initiatives in the 10J"th Congress 
In a normal congressional session, three such sweeping legislative 
initiatives as we have noted-one on administrative process, one on 
a major substantive statutory system, and one on appropriations-
would have dominated debate through an entire session. But there 
was more. The 104th Congress and the market forces that guided its 
anti-regulatory agenda addressed so many more issues that they 
moved by in a blur, each scarcely registering in media attention before 
another came along. 
Here are some of the 104th Congress's further initiatives: 
• "Regulatory reform" through risk assessment and cost-benefit pro-
cedures: 
Two bills that supposedly streamlined bureaucratic procedures by 
requiring rational cost-benefit accounting before regulations could be 
76 The group includes AT&T, BFGoodrich, Coors Breweries, Eli Lilly Co., Kaiser Industries, 
Hoechst Celanese, Polaroid, Textron, and others. 
76 Some riders had little or nothing to do with expenditures, like a CWA override for Kala-
mazoo, Michigan's sewage plant, and riders encouraging EPA to facilitate Indian tribes in 
opening toxic waste dumps on reservation lands. 
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promulgated are the "Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Act of 1995" 
bill77 and its Senate equivalent, the "Comprehensive Regulatory Re-
form Act of 1995" bill78 sponsored by Senator Robert Dole (R-Kan.). 
The terms of the bills, however, would set up an excruciating series 
of procedural and analytical roadblocks before agencies can put for-
ward environmentally protective regulations, while exempting pesti-
cide approvals and similar economically permissive rules. 
There is a fundamental rationality and logic, of course, about as-
sessing risks, benefits, and costs before policies and actions are imple-
mented. In our governing system, however, this process cannot be a 
simple exercise in digital calculations. Even some economists, who 
surely would have loved to find otherwise, have concluded that it was 
naive to think that they or anyone could make risk assessment and 
benefit cost calculations that would specify where to peg particular 
public health and environmental standards.79 Risk assessment and 
benefit cost analysis are important parts of the policy debate, but are 
not instrumental calculations. The bills in Congress, however, require 
a positive calculation before regulation can go forward. It appears 
likely, therefore, that the intent of the risk assessment and benefit 
cost analysis legislation is not to achieve more rational regulation, but 
rather, to achieve regulatory "paralysis by analysis." 
• Regulatory compensation: 
House Bill 925, the "Private Property Protection Act" bill, was yet 
another attack on the environment.80 Landowners who claim that any 
portion of their lands (echoing the conceptual severance argument 
noted earlierl ) has been reduced in value by regulation by twenty 
percent would be entitled to compensation from the taxpayers, and if 
the government does not pay, the regulation would be unenforceable.82 
The Senate "Omnibus Property Rights Act" bill, sponsored by Sena-
tor Dole and thirty-one others purportedly "to clarify constitutional 
takings tests," would apply similar provisions, would require a "pri-
77 H.R. 1022, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (passed by House Mar. 3, 1995). 
78 H.R. 2586, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. Title III (1995). 
711 See generally RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, WORST THINGS FIRST?: THE DEBATE OVER 
RISK-BASED NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES (A. Finkel & D. Golding, eds., 1994); 
Symposium, Risk Assessment in the Federal Gavernment, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 251 (1995). 
80 H.R. 925, l04th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (passed by House Mar. 3, 1995). 
81 See supra note 66. 
82 Under a substitute politically retrenched version of the bill offered by Rep. Billy Tauzin 
(D-La.), the bill would primarily target compensation on the Endangered Species Act, the 
wetlands protections of the CWA, and federal laws that protect water flow in the arid West. See 
141 CONGo REC. 2394 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1995). 
758 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 23:733 
vate property taking impact analysis" of federal rules, and would 
greatly expand the jurisdiction of the regulation-skeptical Court of 
Federal Claims.83 
The regulatory compensation initiative would change the funda-
mental nature of government, asserting that government must pay 
to protect public values.84 From a sovereign public trustee, govern-
ment becomes an involuntary market player, forced either to act as a 
brokerage house in the sky, accumulating and monetizing the benefits 
of public regulation85 and paying off the private enterprises burdened 
by regulation, or to cease to regulate-which presumably is the real 
agenda . 
• Unfunded mandates: 
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 199586 raises substantial 
questions about the federal government's "cooperative federalism" 
strategy of making state agencies, rather than federal enforcement 
officials, the primary instruments for applying environmental quality 
standards. If the unfunded mandates law were applied in its strictest 
terms, states no longer would have to support enforcement of existing 
water and air pollution standards or perform certain oversight of 
toxics.87 In a massive shuddering of governmental machinery, all of 
these functions either would shift to an overburdened and unfunded 
Washington bureaucracy or the federal government would have to 
pay states to enforce these health and safety regulations-an impos-
sibility . 
• "Timber Salvage": 
The so-called "Timber Salvage" rider, attached to the Oklahoma 
City Disaster Assistance bill, has dramatically increased logging of 
ancient forests.86 The rider mandates the United States Forest Serv-
ice and United States Bureau of Land Management to award con-
tracts for timber sales through 1997. These sales would include sales 
83 s. 605, l04th Cong., 1st Sess. § 403 (1995). On the Court of Federal Claims' aggressive 
compensation bent, see generally Thomas Hanley, Comment, A Developer's Dream: The United 
States Claims Court's New Analysis of Section 404 Takings Challenges, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. 
L. REV. 317 (1991). 
84 See generally DeCosse, supra note 13. 
85 Presumably by new and imaginative forms of taxation. 
86 Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995) (signed into law by President Clinton Mar. 2, 1996). 
87 This would occur under the Act if Congress failed to pass a motion authorizing unfunded 
mandates in each case. See id. 
88 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Additional Disaster Assistance, for Anti-Ter-
rorism Initiatives, for Assistance in the Recovery from the Tragedy that Occurred at Oklahoma 
City, and Rescissions Act, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-19, 109 Stat. 194,240 (1995). 
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of green timber, not just fire-damaged trees, even if the sales are 
below cost to the government. The agencies must conduct these sales 
at a greater volume than they currently do, and are ordered to ignore 
the provisions of environmental statutes such as the Endangered 
Species Act and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) as 
well as any judicial decisions prior to the date of enactment. Further-
more, these sales are exempt from administrative review, and the 
rider prohibits courts from issuing preliminary injunctions with re-
spect to any aspect of timber sales. The timber industry orchestrated 
the rider, and subsequently has broadened it even further through 
court action.89 
• Endangered Species: 
A rider attached to House Bill 889, the Defense Appropriations Act, 
signed into law April 10, 1995, prohibits the United States Fish and 
Wildlife Service from listing endangered and threatened species and 
critical habitat.90 Moreover, aside from this rider, the Endangered 
Species Act, which currently requires reauthorization, is the subject 
of a number of pending bills that would drastically reduce its enforce-
able protections.91 
• Federal overrides of state tort laws: 
Another battlefield is the common law. Drawing upon numerous 
anecdotes of tort law excesses, an initiative has long been building to 
cut back on plaintiffs' access to judicial remedies. House Bill 1075, the 
"Common Sense Product Liability and Legal Reform Act of 1995" bill 
would cut back substantially on the ability of plaintiffs to certify class 
actions, to maintain product liability litigation, and to seek damages 
beyond straight compensation.92 The "loser-pays" proposal would like-
89 For more on the "Timber Salvage" rider, see generally Congress and President Enact The 
Most Anti-Environmental Law in History, SAVE AMERICAN FORESTS, Winter 1995--96. The 
industry persuaded a federal judge to order the Forest Service to interpret the rider in broad 
geographic terms, and to reopen sales from areas held back from the past half-century of timber 
sales. Oregon Nat. Resources Council v. Jack Ward Thomas, No. 95--6272-HO, 1995 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 19567, at *5 (D. Or. Dec. 5, 1995) (currently on appeal to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit). 
90 Pub. L. No. 104...u, 109 Stat. 73 (1995). 
91 The major bills attacking the current levels of protection are the "Young-Pombo" bill, H.R. 
2275, l04th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), and the "Kempthorne" bill, S. 1364, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1995). 
92 See H.R. 1075, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (passed the House Mar. 10, 1995). The Senate 
passed the bill with extensive amendments on May 10, 1995, and no further chamber approvals 
have followed. 141 CONGo REC. S6369 (daily ed. May 10, 1995). 
Attempts to chill the common law are not only a feature of the federal political scene. In 
Alaska, for example, a recent statute provides that private nuisance actions cannot be brought 
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wise mean a chilling of litigation by low-income and public interest 
plaintiffs, for whom the assertion of legal rights would become a 
high-stakes gamble. A little-noticed provision of the Senate bill would, 
in addition, override the United States Supreme Court's ruling in 
Daubert v. Merrill-Dow Pharmaceuticals.93 These various restraints 
on plaintiffs are targeted far beyond the reform of excesses. They 
restrict the adjudicability of many externalized costs that over the 
years have found practical remedy only in the courts. 
Note that the House majority, which had argued for states' rights 
in the CWA amendments, here is seeking to impose a federal override 
of state common law. The clear implication from this inconsistency is 
that the majority is guided, not by consistent principles of states' 
rights, but rather by service to market forces. 
There are dozens more antienvironmental initiatives in the pending 
legislation of the 104th Congress. Examples include rolling back na-
tional parks, amending key provisions of the Clean Air Act, Super-
fund, and other toxics statutes, facilitating agricultural use of pesti-
cides, continuing large subsidies for destructive development industries, 
opening the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to oil drilling, and the 
like.94 All of these initiatives reveal the power of anti-regulatory mar-
ket forces and our inability to inject civic values into the governance 
process. 
against industrial polluters that are in compliance with a permit, a move that uses state-wide 
minimum standards to preempt plaintiffs from applying the traditional location-specific protec-
tions of common law. If plaintiffs challenge this as a regulatory taking, the Alaska statute 
provides that the benefited industry shall undertake and pay for the state's defense, and pay 
any compensation assessed. ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.230 (1994). 
93 S. 300, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Section 11 of S. 300 relating to reliability of expert 
evidence, states: "[ w lhere testimony in the form of an opinion by a witness is 'sought to be used 
to establish a novel scientific principle or discovery, it shall be admissible only if the principle 
or discovery, or its scientific underpinning, is sufficiently established to have gained general 
acceptance in the field in which it belongs." [d. § 11. But see Daubert v. Merrill-Dow Pharma-
ceuticals, -U.S.-, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2793 (1993) ("General acceptance" held not necessary to 
admit scientific evidence). . 
94 See, e.g., H.R. 260, l04th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (establishing commission for purpose of 
developing list of parks to close); H.R. 53, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (directing administrator 
to identify pests of significant public health importance and to implement programs to improve 
and facilitate "safe" use of pesticides to combat pests); H.R. 1310, l04th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) 
(banning any wilderness designation and increasing motorized access to more than 90% in 
Voyagers National Park). 
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E. Legislative Process 
In this cacophony of legislative assaults, many were targeted to 
serve short-term profit maximization, rather than to implement the 
social ideals that provided most of the rhetoric for the Contract with 
America before the November 1994 elections. Many would conclude 
that the Marketplace won the election and that environmental law 
was the preordained enemy of the Limbaughian majorities that took 
power. 
Significantly, industrial lobbyists straightforwardly took over the 
legislative process in the 104th Congress-not only drafting bills, but 
also excluding agency participation in formulation of bills, bypassing 
hearings, dominating debate, even sitting with majority members in 
committee meetings to field questions.95 Also significant was the ab-
sence of the press, which because of the speed, bulk, complexity, and 
political mood of inevitability that accompanied the Contract's agenda, 
largely failed to dissect and examine the initiatives as they poured 
forth. 
For a time it looked as if environmental law would be eviscerated 
by the market force avalanche of 1995. As of now, pending the 1996 
elections, the Contract's direct invasion of environmental law does 
seem to be in remission. For the present the Contractarians: 
are increasingly worried that by imposing deep cuts on environ-
mental programs they are doing even deeper political damage to 
their party, and they are beginning to back away from further 
confrontations on environmental issues .... Environmental pro-
grams [are becoming] a "third rail," political slang for issues like 
Social Security that are best not touched because they carry such 
voltage with voters.96 
95 As one commentator noted: 
As stunned Democrats watched in disbelief, Project Reliefs lobbyists were invited into 
the congressional committee rooms and asked to draft the new laws, while the govern-
ment's own environmental experts were firmly excluded. In the judiciary committee, 
lawyers from the electricity and water companies were brought in to chair staff 
meetings that were drafting the [statutory provisions] for their industries. 
Walker, supra note 27, at A2. Democratic members of the committees and government officials 
and staff experts were left out of the drafting sessions. As one minority member noted, "[t]his 
year's process has been limited almost exclusively to the regulated community." Gareth Cook, 
Lawsfor Sale; Republicans in Congress Let Lobbyists Write Laws, WASH. MONTHLY, July 1995, 
at 44. 
96 Cushman, supra note 8, at A2. Linda DiVali, a Republican pollster, reported to the party 
leaders that: 
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In the final months of the 104th Congress, because of Senator Dole's 
candidacy, the leadership role in guiding anti-Clinton legislation is 
passing to the Senate,97 where emphasis is likely to be upon structural 
bills-regulatory cost-benefit reform, restrictions on citizen enforce-
ment remedies, and regulatory compensation bills, all of which are 
poorly understood by the press and the public-rather than upon 
direct attacks against environmental protection statutes. 
Threats to the substance of environmental laws remain, however, 
given the power of human nature and the demonstrated power and 
inclination of the market forces embodied in the Wise Users, Project 
Relief, and their 104th Congress. If the Contract majorities of the 
104th Congress are reaffirmed in the 1996 elections, environmental 
law and the civic role it represents will face again the counter-revo-
lution that currently is laying low.98 Whatever happens, the 104th 
Congress has been an illuminating experience. 
III. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AS A CONSTRAINT UPON THE 
DYNAMIC FORCES OF THE MARKETPLACE 
Market forces are probably the most dynamic sector of human 
society, for good and ill, dominating our individual lives and social 
governance. The drive to maximize profits and to externalize costs in 
human enterprises inevitably makes environmental law necessary, 
and then bitterly resists it. Our society's environmental problems and 
resistance to their solution both arise out of fundamental elements of 
human nature reflected within these market forces. 
some of the party's environmental policies were broadly disdained by Democrats and 
Republicans alike-and by most independents, most young people, and most women. 
By greater than a 2-to-l ratio, voters have more confidence in the Democrats than 
Republicans ... to protect the environment .... Most disturbing is that 55 percent of 
Republicans do not trust their party when it comes to protecting the environment .... 
[d. Significantly, the polled voters' responses were not only a reflection of whom they thought 
would best serve the environment, but that protecting the environment was also a major factor 
in shaping their inclinations to vote for one candidate over another. "Only 35 percent of the 
public would vote to re-elect members of the House who supported ... cutting financing for the 
[EPA] while 46 percent said they would vote not to re-elect them." [d. 
97 See David Corn, Playing the Veto Game, NATION, Apr. 8, 1996, at 5. 
98 For now, as Rep. Henry Hyde (R-Ill.) has said, Contract backers are not pushing for a 
complete overthrow of the regulatory order. "Maybe a mild insurrection, but not a full revolu-
tion. Look, if you can't get a dinner, you get a sandwich, but regulatory reform is on the agenda." 
Phillip Davis, Regulatory Reform Stirs Fears Among House Democrats, National Public Radio 
Morning Edition, Mar. 5, 1996. 
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The human logic of the marketplace lacks a gene for altruism. 
Without external constraints, social and political mechanisms driven 
by individualism are dominated by short-term profit expediencies, to 
the detriment of many short and long-term societal values. They do 
not incorporate principles that protect the community when the in-
terests of the community and the individual enterprise diverge. 
A. Ronald Coase and Rachel Carson 
The basic logic remains as Ronald Coase and Rachel Carson dis-
cerned it in the 1960s-humans tend to make decisions in relatively 
short-term horizons, in insulated, self-referential terms. We tend to 
try to maximize our personal pleasures and profits, we strenuously 
avoid and ignore burdensome liabilities if we can, and we hope or 
pretend that negative consequences will disappear and not accumu-
late to the detriment of others. Coase, the economist, showed us how 
this process of cost externalization is a completely logical and power-
ful tendency in individualized human behavior.99 When we are in-
volved in a productive activity, we resolutely display an inclination to 
pass wide the costs, and to hold close the profits and subsidies, focus-
ing on the short-term. It is a fundamentally rational strategy in indi-
vidual terms, at least for the short-term in which most of us live. The 
economics literature and Ronald Coase's 1960 article, The Problem of 
Social Cost, usefully clarified important elements of human behavior, 
including the nature of humans in economic enterprises and in gov-
ernment agencies.lOo The fundamental perception was that all individ-
99 Coase, supra note 10, at 1. Although Coase's article was a paean to market ordering, it 
served to popularize recognition of social cost externalizations. Welfare economics presumes 
that individuals are powerfully motivated to externalize costs as much as possible, and cost 
externalizations have long been the prime targets for environmental law's accounting process. 
Coase's further argument, that the marketplace would successfully broker these costs so that 
it did not matter who started out with what rights, has not withstood the test of time. It 
depended, as is usual in economic theory, on an unlikely array of wistful market-favoring 
premises, including perfect knowledge of what was going on, absence of effects from wide 
disparities in wealth, and zero transaction costs. Coase's theories have been far more persuasive 
for their underlying explanation of entrepreneurial behavior than for his market-trusting eco-
nomic prescriptions for solutions. 
100 See Coase, supra note 10, at 1,3--5,42-44. Note how the human nature calculus described 
by economists for individuals in the marketplace also describes the individual calculus of agency 
decisionmakers: A public official deciding whether to dream up a massive public works project 
to dam a river, drain a wetland, or build 100 miles of lumber roads into wilderness, does not 
have to pay for the resources. They are already owned by government or can be paid for with 
taxpayer dollars which likewise are effectively free to the official players. Losses of natural 
values are traditionally costless. Agencies feel internal benefits in terms of power (political heft 
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ual decisionmakers will attempt to maximize the amount of benefits 
they can internalize by "externalizing" the maximum related and 
consequential costs onto others who will not be able to hold them 
accountable. 
As a consequence there is a powerful inherent pressure, within 
corporate management and market forces generally, to externalize 
pollution and other social costs into the environment. In the days prior 
to 1960, individual enterprises lived in a version of the frontier myth, 
where each could operate independently on his own terrain, and the 
negative consequences that individual actions generated would disap-
pear away into an all-absorbing tolerant vacuum. 
Wistfully, like many economists, Coase thought that externalities 
could be readily marketized and privately ordered, so that overall 
optimal results could be brokered by the marketplace without requir-
ing the artifices of governmental control.101 His description of the 
problem, however, has been more useful than his optimistic supposed 
solution. Private profit-seeking mechanisms are so powerful, the re-
ceiving commons so diffuse and hard to monitor, and the brokerage 
system required to maintain a trade in social costs so difficult to 
conceive, that the old bipolar players of business and governmenV02 
have been able to continue their business as usual. Social costs con-
tinue to be generated and accumulate in clouds of vastly troublesome 
externalizations. Private corporate decisionmakers and public agency 
officials still often operate as if in an insulated sphere, ignoring the 
detritus and accumulated interacting consequences of their actions. 
Rachel Carson showed us, however, that this tendency is dominated 
by short-term individualized thinking and can be quite dysfunctional 
in overall terms. Humans, corporations, and disparate segments of the 
environment are not dissociated individual islands floating in a vac-
uum; they live in a web of direct and indirect interconnections. Ex-
and ability to spend budgets) and institutional momentum. Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Reflected in a 
River: Agency Accountability and the TVA Tellico Dam Case, 49 TENN. L. REV. 747, 754-55 
(1982). 
101 This requires heroic assumptions about measurability of consequences, as well as perfect 
information, no transaction costs, no disparate access to markets, or disparate resources. See 
Donald Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative 
Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562, 610-16 (1992); see also Coase, supra note 10, at 15-16. 
102 In Lon Fuller's terms, the bipolar system-regulators balancing regulated entities in the 
economy-has always been too narrow a basis for rational societal governance. Instead govern-
mental rationality requires "multipolarity"-including government, industry, and a variety of 
citizen outsiders who, uniquely in the American system, have been able to enter in and playa 
gadfly role. See Plater, From the Beginning, supra note 1, at 995-98. 
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ternalized costs do not disappear, even if they are ignored.103 Externali-
ties go somewhere, and tend to have serious accumulated consequences 
that can end up dwarfing the short-term actions that spawned them. 
Then and now, however, humans and their marketplace do not volun-
tarily rush to take into account the negative effects of what they do, 
so law is necessary and inevitable. 
Since Carson's Silent Spring picked up on Coase's identification of 
social costs, it has become impossible to maintain the out-of-sight, 
out-of-mind illusion that externalities can be ignored. Carson's work 
has helped make it painfully obvious that we all must live together, 
interconnected, in an essentially closed system. Pollution, risk, and 
resource depletion are real social costs that have far-reaching conse-
quences that modern science has learned to track and measure, and 
modern policy has been forced to address as a high utilitarian priority. 
In effect, Rachel Carson spread a broad intellectual catch-basket 
beneath the Coasian welfare economists' universe ofbenefit-maximiz-
ing individual actors, so as to collect and take overall account of 
jettisoned "externalized" social costs, even if they are indirect and 
unmarketized.104 
Rachel Carson showed us how the powerful human tendency to 
externalize can be harmful in overall terms and very hard to correct. 
The marketplace resists rather than embraces the external-cost bro-
kering function that Coase thought could resolve the pollution prob-
lem. The same human nature that has produced the boisterous pro-
ductive energies of modern economies creates the dysfunctions that 
threaten the whole, and powerfully resists integrative civic corrective 
action or accounting. 
Rachel Carson showed that predictable systemic problems follow 
when official players make decisions in traditional terms, looking with 
a narrowed field of vision at short-term benefits, one-shot technologi-
cal horizons: "You got bugs? Well, then, go get a pesticide. Zap. Now 
you've got what you wanted. Dead bugs. The end." As Carson taught, 
however, that is not all that happens. There is no such thing as a 
simple one-shot technology; everything has continuing long-term con-
sequences. Pesticides do not just kill target bugs, they kill many of 
their ecological neighbors as well, eliminating the rich, stable equilib-
103 See CARSON, supra note 10, at 187-98. 
104 There is no such word as "unmarketized," but it is a useful term for denoting consequences 
which do not traditionally or conveniently have a monetary or political market value, but which 
nevertheless have societal importance. 
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rium that had naturally evolved in the land to give it its fertility in 
the first place.105 Pesticides do not just disappear after they have killed 
the target bugs. They linger on and on, blowing in the wind, leaching 
into groundwater, moving up through ecological food chains. 
The lessons Carson drew from DDT pesticides, moreover, readily 
applied themselves to many other settings as well-not only to other 
kinds of pollution, but also to resource management issues like timber 
and grazing, to highway and transportation planning, pharmaceuticals 
and health technology, and by extension to many other areas of na-
tional policy.l06 Although humans may not take account of the real 
social and ecological costs of their actions, nature keeps a comprehen-
sive tab and real consequences follow.lo7 Not to heed the logic of the 
Carson-Coase paradigm-allowing private and public enterprises to 
act as if they are unconnected islands where out of sight is out of 
mind-means that a society risks short and long-term shipwreck on 
the shoals of its own detritus, not just an accumulation of toxics, but 
also a host of other social costs and unintended consequences. lOB 
From this perspective an important utilitarian precautionary prin-
ciple has asserted itself: unless you collectively are sure that the 
negative consequences will be foreseeable, minor, and mitigatable, or 
105 See CARSON, supra note 10, at 54-57, 61. It is remarkable in retrospect how books written 
by three women at virtually the same historical moment so powerfully reshaped so much of 
modern American society's view of life. See generally id.; BETIY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE 
MYSTIQUE (1963); JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961). 
106 Just as others, like John Muir, had foreshadowed Carson's ecological arguments, her logic 
of comprehensive societal accounting was a familiar theme in the work of John Dewey and the 
pragmatists, as well as an underlying premise of welfare economics. 
Indeed, the Carson Paradigm is obvious, virtually a truism. Truism or not, however, it was 
generally ignored as a functional societal policy. Carson's formulation, however, instantly clicked 
with a wide range of people who wanted to take action in the field that came to be known as 
environmentalism, and had broad popular and political impact. Perhaps the environmental 
problems she identified were more tangible, directly related to things people saw around them. 
Perhaps her formulation made coherent critical analysis available to more people, and offered 
more coherent prescriptive corrections. Perhaps it just came at the right time. And insofar as 
the identification of the Carson Paradigm is itself a truism, it seems to be one that usefully 
deserves more attention in ongoing analysis of environmental fact and policy. 
Without casting the proposition so universally as to be meaningless, the crux of Carson's 
logical reminder of the necessity of accounting comprehensively for consequences direct and 
indirect, positive and negative, obviously holds logical significance for current debates about 
industrial policy, immigration, welfare, indeed virtually all human decisionmaking. 
107 When there is uncertainty about the scale of consequences, ecology also teaches the 
precautionary principle that we should as little as possible disrupt the long-evolved diversity 
and eqUilibrium we inherited. 
108 Or, in welfare economics terms, unaccounted externalized costs lead to society-wide subop-
timal results. 
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that the background foundational equilibria will not be disrupted, you 
had better be sure that what somebody proposes to do is worth the 
potential costs. It is safer not to casually risk the escalating domino 
consequences that may follow. 109 In this regard Carson showed that 
moving from a human-centered master-of-nature perspective to the 
holistic human-species-as-constituent-part-of-nature view is not just 
an ethical idea-it is fundamentally practical and utilitarian as well. 
Rachel Carson's concept also changed the scope and hierarchy of 
the perceptual landscape we apply to human actions. Western socie-
ties traditionally have tended to view human actors as the central 
players in the life of the planet, with nature as a subservient and 
pliant backdrop.l1o Carson showed, through the ecological realm, that 
the backdrop to human activity may be far larger in scale and impor-
tance than the human figures pirouetting in the foreground. Nature 
has developed a richly diverse, interacting, and evolving equilibrium111-
communities of communities around the planet providing services pre-
viously unrecognized, fulfilling important productive functions previously 
taken for granted and capable of causing broadly destructive systemic 
consequences when they are disrupted or destroyed.112 
B. Environmental Law as the Embodiment of Public Values 
Environmental law developed in order to take account of the social, 
ecological, and economic values that were getting overlooked in the 
109 The Precautionary Principle lately has achieved international recognition, emerging as a 
major international policy norm. See OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 12, at 59---{i0; U.N. 
CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, THE EARTH SUMMIT 119 (Stanley P. 
Johnson, ed. 1992) [hereinafter EARTH SUMMITJ. 
110 See PLATER ET AL., NLS, supra note 18, at 12-13; cf 1 WINSTON CHURCHILL, HISTORY 
OF THE ENGLISH SPEAKING PEOPLES 140 (1956) (noting story of King Canute, who knew that 
the ocean was more powerful than he). 
m It now generally is conceded that natural equilibria are dynamic, not static balances. There 
is no ideal historical "natural balance" to which all communities can be returned, despite the 
classical rhetoric of some environmentalists. See Fred B. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The 
Influence of Ecological Science on American Law: An Introduction, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
847,848 (1994). 
112 A good homey example is Carson's discussion of the crucial role of diverse soil bacteria and 
earthworms in creating and maintaining soil fertility. Once the soil is poisoned by pesticides 
over vast areas, exterminating or drastically reducing these ecological chains, humans must try 
to replicate the natural pest-control and nutrient-investment cycles. To do this artificially, it 
turns out, is hugely expensive and not very successful. See CARSON, supra note 10, at 55-56, 
107-08,253-55. 
Another vivid extension of Carson's bacteria and earthworm analysis is the human urge to 
dam flowing water. The Aswan Dam and others like it are huge, dramatic edifices ultimately 
dwarfed by their prosaic natural consequences: little snail-borne schistosomes killing and maim-
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calculus of the private corporate marketplace, because some exter-
nally imposed system of civic values had to be applied. It evolved a 
remarkable range of issues and mechanisms, a biodiversity of ap-
proaches and responses developed to address the problems that soci-
ety discovered could no longer be ignored. And it did so primarily at 
the insistence of non-official players-citizen activists and nongovern-
mental organizations who were helped along by a few significant 
disasters vividly covered by the press.113 Public values are not auto-
matically espoused and integrated into laws by legislators or judges, 
but require great counter-entropic efforts to inject them into the 
political process and lawmaking. Environmental law has grown from 
virtual insignificance in 1960 to a complex array of doctrines and 
strategies designed and structured to cope with literally hundreds of 
real problems identified as requiring serious social ordering, stretch-
ing from the backyard and the law of neighbors to global fisheries, 
pollution, climate change, and beyond.114 
Consider environmentalism's amazing subject matter diversity. It 
includes chemical wastes buried in suburban fields, seal puppies clubbed 
to death on floating ice packs, uranium fuel rods shipped overseas to 
nuclear power plants, toxic chemical threats to vulnerable neighbor-
hoods in Italy, India, and Georgia, issues of environmental justice for 
low income neighborhoods and communities of color, the imminent 
extinction of various endangered species, commercialization of na-
tional parks, porkbarrel dam-building, historical preservation, Third 
World rainforests and desertification, rat bites and lead poisoning in 
ing tens of thousands of valley residents; little grains of sediment, deposited by the trillions, 
clogging reservoirs and blocking turbines, causing the washing away of thousands of acres of 
downstream valley lands and coastline, and cutting off nutrient flows to maritime fishing 
industries; and so on. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Multi-Lateral Lending Banks, Environmental 
Diseconomies, and the International Lending Process: The Example of Third World Dams, 9 
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 169, 180-86 (1989) [hereinafter Plater, Third World Damsl. 
113 See the historical overview analysis of the role of citizens in accomplishing the development 
of environmental law, in Plater, From the Beginning, supra note 1, at 989, 1005. 
114 "Beyond" includes outer space. Much of the evolving law of outer space in fact sounds in 
environmental law-issues of space junk in the geosynchronous orbit, normative constraints on 
radioactive contamination of space, and the like, and even the question of whether a Georgia 
entrepreneur should be allowed to launch a mile-wide Mylar billboard into earth orbit to be 
visible like a commercial moon to billions of earthbound potential consumers. See generally 
Daria Diaz, Trashing the Final Frontier: An Examination of Space Debris from a Legal 
Perspective, 6 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 369 (1993); see also Treaty on Principles Governing the Activi-
ties of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies, 18 U.S.T 2410, Oct. 10, 1967; John Kroll, Company Markets Orbital Advertising Space, 
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 13, 1993, at 1c, noted in PLATER ET AL., NLS, supra note 
18, at 41 (Teacher's Manual Update (1994)). 
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urban slums, chlorofluorocarbons thinning stratospheric ozone, global 
warming, and hundreds more.115 
And consider the function of the dozens of environmental statutes 
and doctrines that arose in the United States and became part of the 
accepted legal process. Beginning in the 1970s, Congress passed the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,116 the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act of 1969,117 the Clean Air Act of 1970,118 the Fish and 
Wildlife Coordination Act,119 the Noise Control Act,120 the Clean Water 
Act,121 the Coastal Zone Management Act122 in 1972, and more than 
two dozen more.123 In the years that have followed, the scope and 
number of environmental statutes have continued to grow. 
These modern statutory systems wittingly or unwittingly reflected 
Rachel Carson's teachings. They addressed ecological and economic 
values and problems that had not been acknowledged or had been 
inadequately accounted for, and targeted public as well as private 
enterprises.l24 In each case these statutes imposed new publicly ori-
ented substantive or procedural requirements upon actors who oth-
115 See PLATER ET AL., NLS, supra note 18, at 2-3. 
116 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70d (1994). 
117 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1994). 
118 33 U.S.C. §§ 7521-7671q (1994). 
119 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-61c (1994). 
120 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-18 (1994). 
121 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994). 
122 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (1994). 
123 By my count there were 34 important environmental statutes passed in the three years 
after NEPA. See PLATER ET AL., NLS, supra note 18, at 358-60 (Teachers Manual (1992) 
(historical statutory appendix». Only Jimmy Carter's years come close, with 20 in an equivalent 
span, many of which were perfecting amendments. [d. at 360-62. 
124 The market force pressures that necessitate environmental law are not driven exclusively 
by private actors. Often a combination of public and private power lie behind environmental 
problems-as with nuclear waste exports, porkbarrel water projects, subsidized resource de-
pletions, and the like. 
The putative bi-polar structure of societal governance, with official governmental watchdogs 
guarding against market excesses, in practice has often evolved into a uni-polar laissez-faire 
love-nest, as the marketplace coopted the guardians. "Iron Triangles" are formed by a regulated 
industry, its regulators in the bureaucracy, and the local congressional delegation, and they 
become a powerful status quo, each sector of the triangle enjoying its own intricate system of 
rewards. 
The term "Iron Triangle" appears to have been used originally by Professor Bruce Hammon 
at the University of Illinois and the Coalition for American Rivers in the late 1960s in efforts 
to resist the water resources porkbarrel. The term has useful descriptive application in a wide 
variety of agency-industry settings. See FRED POWLEDGE, WATER: THE NATURE, USES, AND 
FUTURE OF OUR MOST PRECIOUS AND ABUSED RESOURCE 286-89 (1982). Somewhat confus-
ingly, of course, under the rubric being used here, the "bi-polar" paradigm often leads to Iron 
Triangles. Go figure. 
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erwise would have made their operative decisions in dysfunctionally 
narrow terms. 
NEPA is a prime example. NEPA, whether or not Congress under-
stood what it was doing when it passed the bill, reflected both the 
critically important common sense decisional principle that, like indi-
viduals, government agencies should consider all relevant options and 
consequences before they act, and the reality that they were not 
doing SO.125 
The pollution statutes created comprehensive federal standards 
and a comprehensive process for monitoring and enforcing corporate 
compliance with those standards-perhaps the most wideranging, 
voluminous, intricately intensive regulation of human enterprise in 
our history.126 Pollution statutes are the classic examples of regulatory 
requirements that hold externalizing enterprises accountable for the 
social costs they impose. The newer generation of governmental mar-
ket-incentive systems for achieving environmental compliance are no 
less an imposition of public values; only the means by which the values 
are imposed upon market forces are different.127 Planning statutes 
attempt to require rational overall programming to guide public and, 
to a much lesser extent, private decisionmaking. Other statutes focus-
ing on wildlife and endangered species, workplace health, and particu-
lar zones of environmental disruption like coastal areas, similarly have 
attempted to acknowledge systematic problems that previously had 
not been viewed systematically.128 
125 It is likely that Congress did not know what it was doing, but that does not change the 
importance of its implicit strategy, which has subsequently been copied far and wide as a basic 
construct of rational decisionmaking. PLATER ET AL., NLS, supra note 18, at 600. 
126 The Internal Revenue Code and regulations, for instance, have less intensive day-to-day 
application to industrial production activity, and are lesser in bulk than the statutory and 
regulatory provisions of the Clean Air Act, CWA, and Resource Conservation Recovery Act 
(RCRA). 
127 The best recent example of market-incentive statutes may be the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments setting up tradeable pollution credits to encourage efficiency and rewards for 
polluting industries that clean up their emissions. Without a coercive backdrop, however, most 
such market-incentive systems would not function. Compare the quite different approaches 
represented by subsidy programs, where governments pay polluters to stop polluting, with the 
swampbuster provisions of the CWA where farmers get economic supports if they do not 
undercut wetlands protections, and with so-called "free market environmentalism" which urges 
reliance upon voluntary environmental conservation actions by market entities. See generally 
'lERRY ANDERSON & DONALD LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM (1991). 
128 International environmental law picked up the American lead and subsequently has gath-
ered momentum in promulgating a series of conventions. See, e.g., United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea, opened/or signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122, 21 I.L.M. 
1261; Convention on International Trade In Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 
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Thus, the learning from Carson and Coase was put into effect 
through evolving environmental laws. In a vast array of settings, 
environmental law reasserted civic values and attempted to rein in 
the ultimately harmful tendency to cast off and ignore environmental 
effects. 
IV. RESISTANCE TO IMPLEMENTING WHAT WE KNOW: THE 
FOURTH HORSEMAN AND ITS LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 
We have learned a great deal over the past several decades. The 
breadth and depth of our scientific knowledge about population, re-
source use, and pollution, the three major human impacts on the 
planet, have increased exponentially. Environmental science has greatly 
increased its sophistication in understanding, explaining, and predict-
ing the complex interacting cause-and-effect relationships within the 
myriad elements of our ecophysical context. Of course, the more we 
know, the more we do not know. But the growth in scientific knowl-
edge means that we will never be able to go back to the ignorance of 
the 1960s-when we were able to deny or ignore the consequences of 
our actions on the environment. 
But the Fourth Horseman relentlessly harries and pursues the 
expanding science, policy, ethics, and law of our environmental knowl-
edge: the Gap between what we know and what we are able to do 
continues to plague us and our planet. 
Sometimes the problem is that the relevant actors have insufficient 
knowledge.129 But what about those problem situations where we do 
know enough about cause-and-effect to know how actions and behav-
3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243; International Convention For the Regulation of 
Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 10 U.S.T. 952,161 U.N.T.S. 72; United Nations Conference on Environ-
ment and Development: Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, 
Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests, June 13, 1992, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/6/Rev.1, 31 I.L.M. 881. International environmental law also has led to the evolu-
tion and adoption of principles of accounting for environmental social costs like the "Polluter 
Pays" principle in bilateral and multilateral accords, regional structures like the European 
Community, international forums like the Brundtland Commission, and the 1992 United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development at Rio. See, e.g., EARTH SUMMIT, supra note 109, 
at 120. 
129 For example, in the Third World, one encounters difficulty in explaining that deforestation, 
downhill plowing, or field-burning-all of which are traditional practices-have severe conse-
quences in erosion and subsequent infertility. In other settings, of course, information can be 
highly ambiguous or uncertain, which prevents its implementation, especially where delay 
generates individual profits. 
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ior should be changed? It still can be immensely difficult to apply what 
we know. 
Consider what we know about the ozone layer, global warming, the 
expansion of human populations beyond regional carrying capacity, 
overgrazing, the crash of fisheries, multifarious kinds of pollution, and 
on and on. We often know what causes problems-problems that must 
be halted or ameliorated to sustain our future-but are nevertheless 
unable to respond adequately. Why? The Fourth Horseman is driven 
by the fundamental cost-externalizing logic of human nature where 
the collective civic rationality of accounting for public costs is contra-
dicted and resisted by the rationality of an individual entity's cost-
benefit calculus. 
Sometimes the Gap between what we know and what we do is not 
a direct manifestation of market forces. We can understand the fact 
and the dynamics of drastic population growth curves, and the need 
to limit numbers in order to provide meaningful lives for future gen-
erations.130 Effectively addressing this need for limits, however, is 
frustrated by a process involving millions of individual human deci-
sions.131 The difficulty in managing population dynamics lies within 
hormones and the highly individualized realm of procreative behavior.132 
For resource depletion and pollution, however, it is largely market 
forces, both practical and political, that appear to drive the Fourth 
Horseman. As to resources, we can understand the devastating sta-
tistical curves of modern natural resource consumption and despolia-
tion-worldwide crashes in fisheries stocks, loss of forests to unsus-
tainable logging and agriculture, destructive and wasteful mining 
and hydrocarbon exploitation, and loss of arable lands and drinkable 
water-and yet find little or no practical mechanism for enforcing 
sustainable development.133 As to pollution, the complex, intercon-
130 Limiting our numbers is necessary because neither agriculture nor industrial production 
any longer requires the labor of more than 10% of the population. 
131 UNCED, the 1992 Rio Conference, demonstrated an inability to mention population prob-
lems. Moreover, there are even debates about whether there really is a population problem. See 
generally JOEL E. COHEN, How MANY PEOPLE CAN THE EARTH SUPPORT? (1995). The current 
realization of the importance of finding sufficient quality jobs for our populations, and the 
realization that the sense of meaning in human lives comes from what individuals do, compel 
considerations beyond the minimum-necessary-caloric-intake terms of the "carrying capacity" 
debates. 
132 Economics, however, can playa significant driving role in reproductive decisions on the 
individual level, as Hardin discussed in his Tragedy of the Commons. See generally Garrett 
Hardin, The Tradgedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). 
133 The fishery example is classic. See Plater, First Principles, supra note 1, at 674-77. 
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nected, and serious effects of releasing chemical and toxic compounds 
into the environment are increasingly understood, but avoidable dis-
charges and exposures are substantially unregulated in this country 
and abroad. In addition, effective pollution management, which would 
allow sustainable quality of life and development, continues to escape 
US.I34 
Sometimes the problem is practical; the Gap between what we 
know and what we can implement is caused by the physical imprac-
ticality of bringing a socially utilitarian mandate to bear. Consider 
pursuing sustainability by fixing a limit on the number of a species of 
fish that can be taken from a sector of the ocean by a farflung multi-
national fleet-even if a legal quota is established, its enforcement is 
extremely difficult in practical terms.135 Similarly, preventing the de-
struction of rainforests or pollution from Third World agriculture and 
industry is more than a matter of getting a law passed. 
In other settings there is a powerful inclination toward denial-
where conscious recognition of externalized public harms, or acknow-
ledgment of possible regulatory violations, would get in the way of 
maximizing individual benefits.136 Denial, or "an internal veil of opera-
tional expediency," is for all of us, including corporations, a natural 
tendency that can serve to set up resistance and avoidance of envi-
ronmental mandates-even for actors who are not Project Relief 
promoters of the Contract with America.137 
As to the industrialized world, however, and wherever corporate 
actors are involved, the Gap between society's knowledge of what 
should be done and actual implementation is less often a question of 
denial or of the practicalities of enforcement, than of politics and law: 
will political power delay and obstruct the process of applying non-
134 For example, under RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92k, the nation's most comprehensive toxics 
statute, the EPA is able to address only about 20% of the annual waste stream. John C. 
Dernbach, Industrial Waste: Saving the Worst for Last?, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 
10,283 (July, 1990). 
135 See generally John G. Sutinen et al., Measuring and Explaining Noncompliance in Fed-
erally Managed Fisheries, 21 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 335 (1990). 
136 Because of human psychology, there also is often a denial of potential internal, private 
harms. Some riverbank homeowners, enjoying the benefits of their usually beautiful location, 
deny against reason, the tangible dangers of floods. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Floodlines and 
the Police Pawer, 52 TEx. L. REV. 201, 206-{)7 (1974) (and property values are set at the level 
of the stupidest buyer in a market). Engineers build dams without considering dysfunctional 
consequences to the dams, never mind their consequences to the surrounding communities. See 
Plater, Third World Dams, supra note 112, at 169, 186-88. 
137 See Plater, First Principles, supra note 1, at 668-69. 
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profit-generating civil mandates to market enterprises? Tobacco of-
fers a vivid example of why the answer is generally "yes." The tobacco 
industry, acting through the Tobacco Institute, has successfully re-
sisted legal regulation, financial accountability, and even largely pre-
vented government from cutting off subsidies, for an addictive prod-
uct that imposes substantive net public harms. 
The common sense of cost externalization, coupled with observed 
reality, indicates that market players possess potent political forces 
to block or diminish the imposition of public values, forces they natu-
rally employ. The resulting political power of the Fourth Horseman 
is substantial. It is not easy to impose rational social constraints for 
the good of a larger community upon human enterprises driven by 
internalized profits. Consider the way one economic entity attempts 
to resist cost internalization, then mUltiply this result by tens of 
thousands of economic entities, and you have a vast concurrent resis-
tance permeating the governance process. A regulated entity natu-
rally looks to other similarly situated businesses to apply cooperative 
pressure at local, state, and federal levels.13B Fueled by market self-
interest and the tax deductibility of business expenses, market forces 
have built intricately interconnecting and powerful networks of asso-
ciations, each with impressive public relations, research, and lobbying 
budgets targeting the government process. 
Like water flowing downhill, market forces, and the Coasian natural 
laws that drive them, inherently resist any artificial barriers that 
curtail their profit-maximizing externalizations of social costs. To place 
a single sandbag into the current is difficult and not likely to have 
significant effect. As other sandbags are added with great effort, the 
natural forces still pour around them. When finally a working accu-
mulation of sandbags is secured, the waters may mostly turn to the 
path of less resistance, but do not stop trying to infiltrate and under-
cut the obstacles blocking their maximum satisfaction. Across the 
entire face of the environmental law dike, the pressures are felt. 
Lobbyists, lawyers, media managers, and political action committees 
apply insistent and comprehensive pressures to obtain specialized 
subsidies and to suborn the public programs created for broader 
138 See generally Oliver Houck, With Charity for All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415 (1984). Thus, a paper 
company concerned about water pollution regulation participates in various coalitions and 
pressure groups at local, state, and federal levels, some made up of other paper companies, 
others of water polluters generally, anti-regulation manufacturing associations, industry-spon-
sored "public interest law foundations," and think tanks. 
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societal interests. Agencies are blunted or captured by the classic 
double-pronged tactics of the marketplace-strident resistance and 
seduction-and when citizens attempt to get around the phenomenon 
of agency capture139 by going to the courts, the forces of the market-
place try to undercut citizen standing and judicial remedies.140 
There has long existed an earnest institutional effort to resist and 
turn back environmental protections, coming from those who are 
forced to internalize costs previously passed wide to the commons. 
Resistance from the old institutions has been a continuing and pow-
erful part of the evolution of environmental law. Rachel Carson was 
subjected to vitriolic barrages from industry and pointed condescension 
from government agencies. Environmental plaintiffs regularly were 
139 On the classic political science phenomenon of "agency capture," see PLATER ET AL., NLS, 
supra note 18, at 722, 764-66, 827-28. 
Attorney General Richard Olney wrote to the president of a railroad in 1892 in response to 
the latter's plea for abolition of the ICC: 
[t]he Commission ... is, or can be made, of great use to the railroads. It satisfies the 
popular clamor for government supervision of railroads, at the same time that the 
supervision is almost entirely nominal. Further, the older such a commission gets to 
be, the more inclined it will be found to take the railroad view of things. It thus becomes 
a sort of barrier between the railroad corporations and the people and a sort of 
protection against hasty and crude legislation hostile to railroad interests .... The part 
of wisdom is not to destroy the Commission, but to utilize it. 
Letter from Richard Olney to Charles Perkins (1892), in Louis Jaffe, The Effective Limits of 
the Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1109 n.7 (1954). 
140 In the field of statutory enforcement litigation, beginning during the Nixon Court, there 
have been ongoing efforts to cut back access of citizen enforcers to the federal courts, and to 
circumscribe the terms of legislative enactments, reducing them to exercises in form rather 
than substance. Citizens attempting to enforce federal laws can find themselves excluded from 
standing by the terms of Justice Scalia's opinion in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, from a cause 
of action by Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, which seems to give corporate polluters 
one free bite at the apple, and the recent decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 
shielding state defendants, all of which makes citizen enforcement a less credible deterrent to 
industrial decisions to pollute. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, No. 94-12, 1996 U.S. 
LEXIS 2165, at *20 (Mar. 27, 1996); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992); 
Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49, 61 (1987). 
Given the overall logic of many if not most environmental arguments that reach court, there 
is no single coherent theory of defense except to prevent environmental arguments from being 
considered on the merits. The ultimate compliment to environmentalism is that the focus of 
antienvironmental initiatives is to cut off judicial review at the threshold-by relying on doc-
trines of standing, reviewability, exhaustion, and ripeness. In the legislatures, lobbyists for Iron 
Triangles periodically have been able to constrain the scope of citizen enforcement and prevent 
extensions of the process. The decisions of the Nixon and Reagan justices often can be under-
stood through this perspective of resistance against civic accounting, cutting back on standing, 
deferring to Iron Triangle agency decisions, overriding environmental statutes through exer-
cises of activist judicial discretion, cutting back on successful plaintiffs' ability to recover fees 
for statutory enforcement efforts, and so on. 
776 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 23:733 
branded agents of Moscow seeking the overthrow of America's indus-
trial economy.141 
Before the arrival of the Contractarians, Project Relief, and their 
allies, the visible front line of that effort was the so-called Wise Users. 
They presented anecdotes of ordinary citizens-small time ranchers, 
logging families, "Mom and Pop" businesses-all hurt by "Kafkaesque" 
regulations. The Wise Users called, however, not for targeted relief 
for small operators, but for broad corporate deregulation. Who pro-
vided the impetus, money, and media access for the legislative as-
saults against environmental regulation? Like a number of the latter-
day "public interest law firms,"142 the "populist" antiregulatory groups 
turn out to be well-financed fronts for the industries whose externali-
ties induced regulation in the first place-those exploiting our public 
lands in the grazing and timber industries, western water interests 
who receive federally subsidized water from porkbarrel projects at 
prices lower than available in Cleveland or Boston, and those rugged 
individuals from the mining industry who are given their raw mate-
rials from the public domain, without royalties, on the payment of 
trivial fees. 143 As the corporate membership list of Project Relief 
likewise illustrates, the power and momentum behind the assaults on 
environmental regulation come from market players that are forced 
by environmental law to internalize public values. 
The recent anti-regulatory legislation, in other words, does not 
reflect an agenda of good government and regulatory reform, but an 
agenda for the elimination of environmental protections by denying 
civil values.144 
141 See, e.g., Glen Martin, Ecologists Have No Use For "Wise Use," S.F. CHRON., Sept. 7, 1992, 
at C9; Michael Satchell, Any Color But Green, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 21,1991, at 74. 
142 See Houck, supra note 138, at 1460 (noting how the Pacific Legal Foundation and its 
progeny consistently operate as tax deductible fronts for antigovernmental industry positions). 
143 For example, People for the West and its parent organization the Western States Public 
Lands Coalition, are reported to receive 96% of their funding from corporate donors like 
Kennecott Copper Co., Chevron, Hecla Mining, Pegasus Gold Corp., Crown Resources, Great 
Western Chemical, Garber Land & Livestock, Pfizer, Inc., Montana Talc Co., Homestake Mining, 
and more than 30 others. 
144 Internationally, the same market force phenomenon resists international initiatives to 
prevent pollution and protect forests and other global resources-and market resistance is 
supplemented by tensions inherent in the concept of sovereignty. See, e.g., Hardin, supra note 
132, at 1243 (providing reminders of the fractionalizing tendency of sovereignty in international 
management of global commons). 
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LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 
What lessons can be drawn from the civic role of environmental law 
and the powerful resistance it engenders? No matter how much it is 
resented by political-economic establishments, for the remaining his-
tory of the world, or at least as long as humans are around, the 
environmental principle of identifying, anticipating, regulating, and 
accounting for externalized social costs will continue to be an impor-
tant analytical construct. This modest assertion is supported by the 
reality of its fundamental perception: things do have interacting short 
and long-term consequences, and our different human initiatives and 
enterprises do not exist in insulated unconnected boxes. Rational 
societal decisionmaking must integrate an analysis of foreseeable in-
teracting consequences. There is no longer room in the planet's natu-
ral, social, and geophysical systems for broadscale externalization of 
social costs in any decisional calculus. We cannot ignore or sacrificially 
write off avoidable human mistakes that have serious systemic con-
sequences. It is this reality that provides environmental law with a 
broad and legitimate foundation in the fundamental logic of societal 
governance. 145 
Environmental law will continue as an important conduit for the 
meaningful integration of practical social values into the structures of 
national and international governance. It will also continue to be 
resented and resisted by the market forces it constrains. So how can 
the functional role of environmental law be conserved? 
To balance the powerful tendencies toward resistance, environmen-
talism and environmental law must become and remain a part of our 
civic education, never again relegated to the status of a passing fad. 
Despite recent efforts by industrial interests to "roll back Ranger 
Rick" by undermining the environmental education movement's work 
145 In a recent essay, Professor Dan Tarlock, a pioneering environmental law teacher, some-
what dourly worried that environmental law lacks recognized legitimacy and legal depth, 
particularly noting a lack of constitutional roots in the erratic regulatory megastructures of 
pollution law. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial 
Unraveling of Environmental Law, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1121 (1994). Given environmen-
talism's extraordinary rediscovery of public trust law, the complex development of international 
environmental law and custom, state constitutional provisions, as well as the potential effects 
of the Fifth and Ninth Amendments, I think it incorrect to say that environmental law lacks 
such foundations. The common law, moreover, gives this field roots that go back deep into 
medieval history. 
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in building public awareness of environmental costs,I46 the logic of 
environmental analysis will continue to be compelling. Environmen-
talism may well be on its way to becoming the intellectual movement 
of the trans century era, integrating science, philosophy, law, politics, 
psychology, literature, and the arts.147 Environmental science-the 
process of learning ever more about the physical context in which we 
exist and the consequences of our actions therein-will continue to 
grow in its importance, rigor, and inclusive scope, and will become 
part of the scientific canon for all educated people. 
For attorneys, it is clear from the evolution of environmental law 
over the past two decades, and from current turmoils, that environ-
mental law must be thoughtfully reviewed, refined, redesigned, and 
renewed. There cannot be a return to environmental law as it existed 
in 1980. We have learned much since then about what works and what 
does not, what is important and what is not, what is worth the effort 
and what is not. 
As to market forces' efforts to undercut environmental law, they 
will continue at various levels of the political process. Given the in-
herent political power of this resistance, the lessons of the 104th 
Congress emphasize the importance of incisive public interest analy-
sis and press coverage in order to shape the debate. 
It was distressing to watch the 104th Congress propose cataclysmic 
changes to federal and state environmental laws, in a lobby-domi-
nated legislative process marked by very low levels of factfinding, 
intellection, and debate. National legislative leaders denied the facts 
146 The history of the North American Association for Environmental Education (NAAEE), 
the dominant organization of environmental education, has reflected the recent increasing 
pressures from industries distressed by the teaching of environmental sensitivities in our 
nation's schools. See Thomas Harvey Holt, Growing Up Green: Are Schools Turning Our 
Children into Eco-Activists?, REASON MAG., Oct. 1991, at 36. The NAAEE conferences now 
are sponsored generously by the same industries that currently are attacking environmental 
legislation in the 104th Congress. Many educators report great pressures being brought against 
discussion of "controversial" or "partisan" issues like recycling, clearcutting, and the like, and 
tend to adopt a defensive strategy of "laying low," avoiding public policy issues, ·and attempting 
to achieve innocuousness. In Arizona, an industry strike force of the so-called Wise Users, with 
a budget of hundreds of thousands of dollars, defeated an environmental education initiative. 
Industry prepares large volumes of glossy antienvironmental school materials, but has recently 
been able to stigmatize the National Wildlife Federation's Ranger Rick magazine as inappro-
priately partisan. The effort to prevent the next generation from learning environmental civics 
will continue. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmental Citizenship and Political Controversy: 
The Challenge of Bringing Analysis of Public Policy Issues into Environmental Education, 
Address at the Proceedings of the NAAEE Conference (1995). 
147 See Jay Parini, The Greening of the Humanities, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 29,1995, at 52. 
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of environmental science so painfully gained over the past thirty 
years-although this New Unlearning cannot make the earth flat by 
political fiat.148 The Contract's assault on environmental law revealed 
a basic systemic vulnerability, a process opacity in the politics of 
legislation. Market pressures upon the legislative process are most 
effective when they can maintain low visibility. If the press can isolate 
and illuminate issues on their merits, the public civic merits will tend 
to dominate debate. When initiatives are not made publicly visible, 
however-because they appear as a blur like the 104th Congressl49-
decisions will tend not to be made on their public merits. 
Of the anti-regulatory legislative provisions catalogued in this es-
say, which represent only a small portion of the total in the 104th 
Congress, how many were examined with some particularity by the 
national media prior to the key votes on the bills? With the possible 
exception of the Timber Salvage rider, the answer is probably none. 
Most of the story was barely touched upon by the media, and that is 
deeply distressing. 
We are entering into an intricate, complex, and significant area of 
inquiry, in which simplistic stands and sound bite quips miss the 
reality and fundamental importance of the contending issues. This is 
nothing less than the basic question of Democracy and Justice-how 
to balance the Individual and the Community, private and public 
rights and duties.150 It raises fundamental questions about what gov-
ernment is and should be-a compact for implementing civic public 
148 Like prior counter-revolutions, the present onslaught cannot succeed in the long term, 
because the utilitarian significance of the science and fact of environmental protection ultimately 
is inescapable. Given the potency of modern technologies, however, it is possible that by political 
fiat the earth nevertheless can be dealt some damaging long-term blows, as the Timber Salvage 
rider sadly is demonstrating. 
149 One thoroughly disenchanted commentator noted: 
[j]ust trying to get a count on all the sneaky anti-environmental stuff now floating 
through Congress like fecal coliform bacteria is a major journalistic sewage project. 
'lUcked away in riders here, amendments there, in little zits on the appropriations bill, 
are so many measures to damage the environment that it amounts to one big stink. 
Molley Ivins, The Environment Doesn't Respond to Political Spin, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 25, 
1995, at B5; see also, Davis, supra note 26, at 18-20. 
150 Human nature has two sides that are contending: an exploitative, individualistic side that 
is reflected in our economic, marketplace life, and a civic, social stewardship side that is reflected 
in our moral, ethical, and cooperative governance tendencies. Guess which one normally is 
dominant, both within us as individuals and within the society that reflects us? Individual 
perceptions of hunger, or of burgeoning appetite, tend to collapse the second, and magnify the 
first, as most of the time we just look out for Number One. The anomaly of the 1960's can be 
explained as fat years when hunger was less an issue, while the music, sex, and purple haze 
diminished aggressive human appetites and built group social feelings. 
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values or a brokerage house in the sky, marketizing costs and benefits 
and paying in taxpayer dollars for the right to regulate private eco-
nomic behavior. 
Engaged citizens must work with the press and the political process 
to illuminate the factual merits of the issues and the public values at 
stake in lobbying assaults on environmental law and other public 
interest structures.151 In the longer run, our society needs an institu-
tionalized information forum to facilitate the ability of journalists, 
policymakers, and government officials to cope in real time with the 
mindnumbing complexity of modern science, law, and economics.152 It 
could lift us above the current political tyranny of infotainment and 
the race-to-the-bottom in political discourse. 
Ultimately it comes down to democracy in an American population 
that is often regarded by politicians, merchandisers, embattled public 
interest lawyers, and itself as a ponderous lumpenmass of impression-
able, unthinking Homer Simpsons. The public values of environmental 
analysis Ultimately depend upon the counter-entropic thoughts and 
efforts of those who feel committed to civic values as well as to their 
own individual welfare. As Thomas Jefferson said, "I know of no safe 
depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the people them-
selves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their 
control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from 
them, but to inform their discretion."153 
151 A number of law professors have begun organizing an effort to raise the level of public 
debate by preparing reliable technical analyses of the public merits of ongoing legislative 
initiatives. The "La Paloma" initiative can be accessed at paloma@bc.edu. 
152 That function should draw upon the amazing capacities presented to us by the Internet 
and the Worldwide Web. 
Such a forum would permit quick and accurate responses to Limbaughian assertions (like the 
House majority leader's recent argument that chlorofluorocarbon regulations in the Montreal 
Protocol were based on scientific fraud), operating as a high-level information service and truth 
squad. By its very existence, such an information forum would raise the level of national debate. 
Reporters always would know that there was a place to go for quick access to the merits, and 
that if they did not go there, their competition would, making them look bad or superficial. Even 
politicians might learn that their comments would face informed rejoinders, ridicule, or support, 
depending on how well-founded they were on the merits. 
153 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820), reprinted in PLATER ET 
AL., NLS, supra note 18, at 655. 
